ISLAMIC AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
BORROWING POSSIBILITIES OR A HISTORY OF BORROWING?
Azizah Y al-Hibri"
INTRODUCTION

Islam is commonly viewed in the West as being incompatible with
democracy. It is also viewed as an "Oriental" religion that has
spawned violence and encouraged human rights violations. Because
of the historical interaction between the West and Islam, the United
States has recently been supporting efforts to export its democratic
principles and human rights values to Muslim countries. In this context, the question of constitutional borrowing gains special significance.
To assess the possibilities of constitutional borrowing between Islamic countries and the United States, it is important to first discuss
the historical relation between the two, as well as between Islamic
concepts and early American thought on democracy. For this reason,
some basic features of Islamic constitutionalism will be introduced
and analyzed. Islamic concepts are rooted in the Qur'an, the most
fundamental source of guidance for all Muslims, and related secondary sources. Examination of these sources reveals that most Orientalist writing on the nature of Islam during the eighteenth century
was either distorted or false. Most importantly, for our purposes in
this article, this examination will also provide the reader with a more
adequate basis for comparing Islamic constitutionalism with American constitutionalism.
The resulting data will establish a solid basis for an answer to the
question: "Can American democracy be exported to Muslim countries today?" This article answers this question by concluding that (i)
democracy is critically needed in many Muslim countries, but that (ii)

Professor, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond; President, Karamah:
Muslim Women Lawyers for Human Rights. The author would like to thank her research assistant Ghada Qaisi for her valuable research at the Library of Congress and Monticello. The
author also thanks her student Adisa Muse for his assistance during the last stages of this article's preparation. Special thanks to former student NancyJensen, whose term paper a few years
ago, and subsequent research, fueled and advanced parts of this inquiry. <aalhibri@richmond.edu>.
The University of PennsylvaniaJournal of Constitutional Law has not verified the content
of the Arabic language sources cited in this Article.

1999]

ISLAMIC AD AMERICAN CONSTITUTIOAL LA

attempts to transplant Western secular systems of democracy to Muslim societies ignore these societies' fundamental spiritual nature, and
that (iii) a more indigenous Islamic solution to the problem is more
likely to succeed. The salient features of an Islamic solution to the
perceived secular-spiritual conflict inherent in constitutional borrowing between Muslim and Western societies will be described in the
body of this paper.
I. THE AMERICAN VIEW OF ISLAM
Islam is often viewed as an "Eastern" or "Oriental" religion, which
is in its very essence incompatible with democracy and disrespectful
of human rights.' Its recent visibility in the United States and Europe
has not ameliorated this view in any significant way. American Muslim immigrants, for example, are viewed even today as alien to our
system of democracy and human rights, and hence somewhat suspect.2 This suspicion is deeply-rooted and has been manifest as early
See, ag, Judith Miller, The Cludenge ofRadical Islam, FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Spring 1993. at 43.
50-54 (quoting Bernard Lewis that Islam and liberal democracy do not make natural bedfellows
and discussing human rights problems);JOHN ESPOSITO &JOHN VOLL, ISLt AND DEMIOCRACY
23 (1996) (stating that non-Muslims and some conservative Muslims have argued that it is impossible to have an "Islamic democracy"); Kathryn Webber, The &onomie Future of Afghan
Women: The Interaction Between Islamic Law and Muslim Culture, 18 U. PA.J. INTr'L ECON. L 1049,
1056-57 & n.27 (1997) (referring to the ongoing debate over the compatibility of Islam and international human rights agreements); DressingDown,FIN. TwIES (London), Feb. 1. 1994. at 19
(announcing a debate at the Oxford Union on whether Islam and democracy are compatible):
Ken Adelman, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 3. 1996, at A15 ("Tlat Islam remains incompatible with liberty limits the spread of democracy in the post-communist wvorld."). For more on Orientalism," see EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM 59-61, passim (1979).
2 See generally COUNCIL ON AM.-ISLAMIC REL RES. CENTR. THE STATU'S OF MUSL
CIVIL
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1998, at 10, 11, 24 (1988). The negative perception of Islam in
the West has been demonstrated in newspaper reporting:
After decades of scaring ourselves 1ivtless about reds-under-te-bed, it now
not
turns out that we were worrying about the -wrong men in beards. It's
the boring drones of Marxist-Leninism who threaten our world, but tie
mullahs-under-the-mattress, the supposed ild-eyed religious fanatics uith
bombs under their arms that we should have been terrified of all along as
we live in an age of Islamaphobia.
Gavin Esler, Stereoapesof Thror That Are FundamentallyFlau4SCOTS1,tAN. Aug. 31. 1998, at 11; see
also Larry B. Stammer & Carla Hall, Terror in Oklahoma City, LA. TLMES, Apr. 22. 1995, at A22
(reporting that in the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing American Muslins were stereotyped as terrorists and became targets of hostility). This attitude, while disproportionately directed against Muslims, is not and has not been unique to Muslims. French visitors to the
United States in the eighteenth century at times received similar treatmenL For example,
eighteenth century author Abbe Constatin Francois de Chassebouf Volney's presence in the
United States sparked much controversy. Volney uns accused in 1797 of being a French spy
sent to obtain information to prepare for the re-occupation of Louisiana. See 4 E. MILuCE.Nr
SOWERBY, CATALOGUE OFTHE LIBRARY OF THO.IASJEFFERSON 213 (1953); Letter fromJohn Adams to Thomas Jefferson (Jan. 23, 1825), in 16 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 102-03
(Albert Eliery Bergh ed., 1903) [hereinafter BERGH] (commenting on the lack of freedom of
inquiry and speech in the United States and explicitly mentioning that translating tie works of
Volney and Dapin could get an individual in trouble). Volncy is also singled out by the drafters
of the Alien and Sedition Act of 1798. Jefferson sought to attack the proposed law before it ap-
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as the eighteenth century.3 During that period, several American
novels featured either fictional Muslim s pies in America or oppressed
Muslim women confined to the seraglio.
Many eighteenth century authors, from Voltaire to Prideaux and
Volney, wrote important works about Islam that were eagerly read in
the United States. 5 Unfortunately, some authors were not quite concerned about historical accuracy.6 Furthermore, those individuals
who contemplated religious views somewhat different from those of
the mainstream were branded as "infidels." 7 Various books about Islam that appeared in the eighteenth century created an atmosphere
of disdain, hostility and distrust of Muslims. Among these books was
one entitled The Nature of the Imposture, Fully Displayed in the Life of Mahomet.8 The message of the book was that the combined use of false
religion and military power could subdue people. 9 Both the book
and the message were used by Mathew Lyon, a staunch critic of the
Federalists, to attack President Adams. 10
peared on the books. In a letter
have given Congress the power to
Volney and Collet." Letter from
BERGH, supra, at xviii.
See ROBERTJ. ALLISON, THE

to James Madison, Jefferson mentioned that the bill would
deport suspected aliens: "this is understood to be meant for
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Apr. 26, 1798), in 18
CRESCENT OBSCURED: THE UNITED STATES AND THE MUSLIM

WORLD 1776-1815, at xv-xvii, 20 (1995).

A number of books on the Muslim world were published in the United States in the 1790s. See id. at xv-xvii, 20. These novels, histories, captivity
narratives, and biographies on the Prophet Muhammad conveyed a picture of impoverishment
wrought by despotic rulers, honest commerce perverted into piracy, and debased women. See
id. In essence, to the Americans striving to forge a new country, these writings conveyed a cautionary lesson of what must be avoided.
See Timothy Worthington Marr, Imagining Ismael: Studies of Islamic Orientalism in
America from the Puritans to Melville 103 (1997) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) (on file with the Yale University Library); see alsoALLISON, supra note 3, at 61-85 (providing
an Orientalist view of Muslim women).
, See, e.g., HUMPHREY PRIDEAUX, THE TRUE NATURE OF THE IMPOSTURE, FULLY DISPLAYED
IN
THE LIFE OF MAHOMET (1697); ABBE CONSTANTIN FRANCOIS DE CHASSEBOUF VOLNEY, TIlE
RUINS, OR A SURVEY OF THE REVOLUTIONS OF EMPIRES (1796) [hereinafter THE RUINS]; ABBE
CONSTANTIN FRANCOIS DE CHASSEBOUF VOLNEY, TRAVELS THROUGH EGYPT AND SYRIA IN TIlE
YEARS 1783, 1784 & 1785 (1798) [hereinafter TRAVELS]; FRANCOIS MARIE AROUET DE VOLTAIRE,
MAHOMET, THE IMPOSTER: A TRAGEDY IN FIVE ACTS (1777).

6 See ALLISON, supra note 3, at 59. Muslims were consistently depicted as submissive and
accepting of religious and political despotism. See id. The claim that Islam is the source of political tyranny was often a central theme. Prideaux, for instance, depicted Prophet Muhammad
as a religious heretic who had exploited religious indifference to create religious and ultimately
political tyranny. See id- at 38.
7 See ABBE CONSTANTIN FRANCOIS DE CHASSEBOUF VOLNEY, VOLNEY'S
ANSWER TO DOCTOR
PRIESTLY ON HIS PAMPHLET ENTITLED, "OBSERVATIONS UPON THE INCREASE OF INFIDELIIY' 4

(1797) [hereinafter OBSERVATIONS]. Priesty's pamphlet attacked Volney personally and his
work The Ruins. In response, Volney wrote that Priestly was pleased to class his pamphlet among
the writings of modem unbelievers, see id. at 4, and replied that no one had the right to ask him
of his religious opinions, see id. at 8.
PRIDEAUX, supra note 5.

See id, passim (especially 23, 25, 27, 32, 68-69, 89-90) (warning that the consequence% of
religious indifference would be religious slavery).
See ALLISON, supra note 3, at 41. Lyon was jailed for charging Adams with using the "sacred name of religion" as a "State engine to make mankind hate and persecute one another."
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Another book, entitled Cato's Letters, an English work which became highly influential in this country, pronounced the Prophet
Muhammad a great imposter who deceived and destroyed his people
with their own consent." In support of their view, the authors cited
the Turkish empire and other Muslim states which they claimed forbade printing and thus restricted free speech.'12 Other authors corroborated these views directly or indirectly. Even Volney, who was a
great admirer of old civilizations, noted the state of apathy and indolence that had permeated many Muslim countries."
Volney and many other writers were concerned about the reasons
that contributed to the decline of Islamic civilization. They uanted
later civilizations, especially the nascent American society, to avoid a
similar fate. Their conclusions varied. Some blamed what they perceived to be the Islamic attitude of fatalism.it Others blamed what
they believed to be the discouragement of free thinking within Islamic civilizations. '6 There was, however, general agreement that t)Tanny, fostered by religion, coupled with the acceptance by the Muslim people of such tyranny, were at the heart of the problem.'7

Id Lyon was convicted because of this and other statements he had made in Congress. and in
letters to his constituents, stating that Adams was a "notorious and seditious person, and of a
depraved mind, and wicked and diabolical disposition." Id.
See 1 JoHN TRENCHARD & THoMAs GORDON, .kTo'sLETTERS., OR EssAYS ON LIBERTY, CIVIL
AND RELIGIOUS, AND OTHER LtPORTANT SUBJECTS, vol. II, at 131 (Russell & Russell 3d ed. 19691
(1733).
1 See2 TRENCHARD & GORDON, supranote 11, vol. III, at 33 ("In Turkey, Printing is forbid
[sic] ....Nor isprinting in other Arbitrary Countries of much use but to rivet their Clains.'".
"Arbitrary Countries" refers to authoritarian countries, many of which %vereMuslim. See td. at
301 (discussing the examples of the "Caliphs of Egypt." the "Monarchy of Persia," and tie empire of Turkey); id., vol. I,at 188 (discussing the "Muley ... of Morocco," and tie Turkish
Court); see alsoALLISON, supra note 3, at 47-48 (claiming that in tie West, books and panmphlets
allowed all issues to be discussed freely and expressed in print, while in Turkey, only one book
had been printed in the eighteenth century) (citing JOHN Foss, AJOIt,%L OF THE Q UtMY
AND SUFFERINGS OFJOHN Foss, SEVERAL YEARS A PRISONER AT ALGIERS: TOGETHER %%Tni SO.IE
ACCOUNT OF THE TREATMENr OF CHRISTIAN SLAVES WHEN SICM -AND OBSERVATIONS ON THE
MANNERS AND CusToMS OF THE ALGERINES 75-76 (1798)).

13 See ALLISON, supra note 3, at 51-54 & n.26. For example, many American writers concluded that a wicked religion had fostered bad government, and a bad government had, in
turn, thwarted social progress. See id. at 53-54. Jean Charles Leonard Simonde de Sismondi
concluded that the poison that had destroyed the Muslim world came from within. See id. at 51.
14SeeTRAvELs, supranote 5, at 7-8; see alsoALISON, supra note 3, at 48 (noting tie fatalisuc
attitude of Muslim people as leading to "indolence").
"- See ALLISON, supranote 3, at 48 (arguing that Volney in particular believed that tie "Islamic idea of predestination and the Muslim's willingness to accept everytling and anything as
the will of God" led to indolence). Allison argued that Turkish despotism had no reason to
change, for its mere existence was viewed as reflecting God's will. See id.For a more recent discussion of the notion of Islamic "fatalism,* see THOMAS W. LIPP.LmN, UNDERSTANDING ISLAM: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE MUSLIMI WORLD 75-78 (2d. rev. ed. 1995).
16SeeALLISON, supranote 3, at 50-51 (discussing how religious intolerance had stifled free
inquiry and prevented men from rising out of their misery in Egypt and Syia).
The perception of tyranny in Islamic countries generally available to Westerners is illustrated in Cato's Ltter.

It is even Capital , and certain Death [in Turkey], only to reason freely
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Subsequent discussion centered 18on how the American system of governance could avoid such a fate.
Nevertheless, Islamic constitutional precedents played a part in
the constitutional debates in the United States.' 9 For example, Alexander Hamilton argued for giving the federal government the right
to impose taxes by referring to the example of the Ottoman empire.
He noted that the sovereign of that empire had no right to impose a
new tax.' ° As a consequence, the Ottoman sovereign permitted the
governors of the provinces to impose these taxes, and then squeezed
out of the governors the sums he required for his and the state's expenses. 2' Hamilton concluded, " [w] ho can doubt that the happiness
of the people in both countries would be promoted by competent
authorities in the proper hands... ?"2
In the debates of 1787, Anti-Federalists, using what they judged to
be the example of the despotic Turkish government, argued against a
strong central government, and demanded guarantees of individual
liberties and religious freedom.23 In particular, Daniel Webster, Patrick Henry and Patrick Dollard spoke of the evils of Turkish despotism. 4 Alexander Hamilton, on the other hand, saw deeper into the

upon their Alcoran .... A sure sign of Imposture [Islam, viewed as a false
religion] I But by Imposture, Stupidity, and Janzaries [military or police
force] his Throne is supported; and his vast but thin Dominions, know no
inhabitants but barbarous, ignorant, and miserable Slaves.
2 TRENCHARD & GORDON, supra note 11, vol. III, at 32-33 (bracketed statements added by Editor); see also I TRENCHARD & GORDON, supra note 11, vol. II, at 131 (noting the acceptance of
Muslims of Mahomet, an "enem[y] of Liberty, Truth, and Peace"); id. at 300-01 (discussing the
tyranny of Egypt, Persia and Turkey); i&, vol. I, at 187-89 (discussing the submissiveness of Muslims to tyranny); ALLISON, supra note 3, at 51-53, 59 (discussing the Western use of Muslim culture as an illustrative example of the different consequences of religious and political beliefs);
sura notes 6, 13-15 and accompanying text.
8 See Patrick Henry, Virginia Convention, 16June 1788, in 2 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION
696 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) (examining the issue that there is no provision in the Constitution against maintaining a standing army during times of peace). See generally ALLISON, supra
note 3, at 57-59 (citing the frequent reference to Muslim cultures during the constitutional debates of 1787-88).
19 See ALLISON, supra note 3, at 57, 59 (citing reference to Muslim cultures
during the constitutional debates of 1787-88). Libertarians, such as Mathew Lyon and Thomas Paine, as well as
conservatives, including John Adams and Alexander Hamilton, employed the popular view of
Islam in their political arguments. See id. at 59. Anti-Federalist critics such as Patrick Dollard,
during the South Carolina Convention of 22 May 1788, and Patrick Henry, in the Virginia Convention of 16 June 1788, used the image of Turkish despotism to attack the proposed government. See id.
at 57-58.
20 SeeTHE FEDERALIST NO. 30, at 188 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Cooke ed.,
1961).
21 See id (arguing for centralized authority to levy taxes by analogizing to
the negative consequences illustrated by the Turkish empire).
2 Id.
23 See ALliSON, supranote 3, at 57.
24 See Patrick Dollard, South Carolina Convention, 22 May 1788, in 2 DEBATE ON
TIIE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 18, at 593-94; Patrick Henry, Virginia Convention, 16June 1788, in 2
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 18, at 696; Daniel Webster, A Citizen of America, in 1
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 18, at 150-51 (arguing against a constitutional provision prohibiting a standing army during times of peace).
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Turkish example, recognizing a complex power structure. He argued
that, from one perspective, the Turkish sultan was in fact weak and
had limited powers. Hamilton then concluded that a strong central
government
would protect people from oppressive local govern26
ments.

Western commentators on Islam, as external observers, viewed
Muslim regimes as embodiments of Islamic principles, although, as
a later section of this paper will show, nothing could have been further from the truth. This Western misperception of Muslim regimes
made it more difficult for most Western authors to understand or
present Islam as it was truly revealed in the Qur'an." This problem
has persisted in various degrees in this country for the last couple of
centuries.
While Islam and Muslim countries were understood by the American population from the point of view of the "Other," some Founding Fathers made serious efforts to educate themselves about Islam
and its civilizations. Despite these efforts, the Founding Fathers' attempts to avoid what they saw as the underlying reasons for the failure of democracy in Muslim countries were ultimately misdirected:
Their misunderstanding of Muslim civilizations was based on inaccurate or incomplete information, which produced unreliable analysis.
In this article, I would like to revisit the issue of democracy in
Muslim countries, and provide my own analysis for its failure. I shall
then inquire as to whether our Founding Fathers, notwithstanding
erroneous analysis, succeeded in avoiding the pitfalls that frustrated
attempts to establish a stable Muslim shuratic (consultative) democracy. I shall also inquire as to whether the resulting American democratic system is so alien to Muslim thinking as to make its export to
Muslim countries an impossibility, or whether the resulting system
represents a truly viable solution for Muslim problems today.

See FEDERALIsr No. 30, supra note 20, at 188 (noting that the sovereigns in the Turkish
emire, although absolute masters of their subjects, had no right to impose axes).
See id. at 188-89 ("In America, from a like cause, the government of the Union has gradually dwindled into a state of decay, approaching nearly to annihilation.").
Compare supra text accompanying notes 15-18, uith infra Section V (discussing subsequent
events which contributed to the demise of genuinely Islamic democratic principles in Muslim
civilizations).
See infra notes 37-44 and accompan)ing text. George Sale was careful to cast his discussion
of the Prophet Muhammad in negative terms, in conformity with the attitude of the day. Sale
took liberty, however, in praising the Prophet for his virtue as a leader, see S.U., infra note 38, at
51, and commended the Prophet's ability to disseminate knowledge of the 'true God- to the
.pagan Arabs." Id. As to particular Islamic principles. Sale discussed the treatment of women,
acknowledging that the Prophet enjoined Muslims to treat women wvith respect and recognize
their right to inherit from their parents, husbands and other relatives. See i& at 183. Sale also
noted that Islam put an end to the pagan custom of female infanticide. Set i. at 174.
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II. THE VIEWS OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS
Many of the Founding Fathers were not as uninformed about Islam as are the rest of us, even today. Indeed, some made a special effort to read about Islam and related ancient civilizations. 29 Thomas

Jefferson's library contained at least one copy of the Qur'an and was
rich with books about ancient civilizations, including Islamic ones.0
Jefferson appeared to consider his knowledge of these matters important for the development of the American model of political governance. In that approach, he was not alone.
Madison, for example, read about ancient confederacies before
formulating his own proposal for a federal system in the United
States.3' The resulting system, however, was decidedly American. It
is, therefore, not surprising that T. J. Barlow reported to Jefferson
from Paris that the "federality" of our system of government "is not at
all understood in Europe even in theory. The best writers dont [sic]
know what we mean by it."32
It is sometimes easy to forget how exciting the period was in which
our Founding Fathers lived. It was a period in which they felt that
they could design a system of governance from which the rest of the
s
world would benefit.3
They took that responsibility seriously. So,

See generally 1-5 SOWERBY, supra note 2 (relating thatJefferson's personal library, sold to
the Library of Congress in 1812, contained a significant number of books on these subjects, including works by Volney, comparative religious works byJoseph Priestly, Petis de la Croix's Histoire de Timur Bec, Kosmopolitos' The Revolt of Ali Bey, Sir Paul Rycaut's The Histoy of the Present
State of the Ottoman Empire, Thomas Broughton's History of All Religions, and Samuel von Pufendorf's The Law of Nature and Nations); see also THOMAS JEFFERSON'S LiBRAR: A CATALOG WITH
THE ENTRIES IN His OWN ORDER 58 (James Gilreath & Douglas L. Wilson eds., 1989); DOUGLAS
L. WILSON,JEFFERSON's BOOKS (1996) (discussingJefferson's library and book collections).
Alexander Hamilton and James Madison evaluated the governmental structures of the
Ottoman Empire and Persia. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 19, 30, reprinted in 4 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, 384-90, 450-51 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1962); Constitutional Convention:
Remarks on the Abolition of the States, reprintedin 4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra, at
211.
30 See FRANK L. DEWEY, THOMASJEFFERSON LAWYER 14 (1986) (noting that
records of the
Virginia Gazette show that Jefferson purchased a copy of Sale's Koran while he was a student at
the College of William & Mary in 1764-65). Most likely, Jefferson owned two copies of the
Qur'an, asJefferson lost all his papers and books in the February 21, 1770, fire which destroyed
his Shadwell, Virginia home. See id. at 51. Yet a copy of the Qur'an was included in Jefferson's
collection sold to the Library of Congress in 1812. See 2 SOWERBY, supranote 2, at 90.
31 See Letter fromJames Madison to ThomasJefferson (Apr. 27, 1785),
in I THE REPUBLIC OF
LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMASJEFFERSON ANDJAMES MADISON 1776-1790, at
367-71 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995) (requesting books on ancient and modem federal republics from ThomasJefferson whileJefferson was in Paris).
32 Letter fromJoel Barlow to ThomasJefferson (Feb. 11, 1804),
microformed on ThomasJefferson Papers, Manuscript Division (Library of Congress).
See Letter from Joel Barlow to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 25, 1801), microformed on Thomas
Jefferson Papers, Manuscript Division (Library of Congress) ("I now indulge myself in the hope
that we are not to lose the fruits of former labors, but that we may be wise enough to improve
the unspeakable advantages which we possess, and that other nations may have at least an opportunity of profiting by our example.").
2
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while the general public was referring to Prophet Muhammad as an
"infidel" and an "imposter,"Jefferson was reading and corresponding
with Volney, the author of controversial books on ancient Middle
Eastern civilizations.-" Jefferson even quietly translated parts of Volney's controversial book entitled The Ruins, which discusses Islamic
civilizations, among others. Jefferson asked Volney to keep this fact
confidential, a testimony to the political pressures of the time.'
The Founding Fathers were interested in any precedent, regardless of geography, which could illuminate their work. Patrick Henry,
for example, asked the Virginia ratifying convention, "Who has enslaved France, Spain, Germany, Turkey and other countries which
groan under tyranny? They have been enslaved by the hands of their
own people." It was important for the Founding Fathers to lay down
the foundation of a system of government which would not breed
apathy or result in tyranny. To this end, the example set by the Muslim states .was important, given the stature and long history of the Islamic civilization.
Not all that the Founding Fathers read about Islam was negative.
Despite popular opinion, some concluded that they needed to have a
better understanding of Islam in order to reach a correct analysis.
For this reason, Jefferson and others read many books that the public
found highly controversial. The first volume of Sale's Koran, owned
by Jefferson, consisted of the author's exposition and personal assessment of the Prophet Mohammad and the religion he professed. "
In a gesture reflecting public opinion, Sale refers to the Prophet as
an "infidel" and an 'imposter. ' "" The thrust of his discussion, however, is to provide a fair assessment of an individual and a religion
which was grossly misunderstood in this country. In an introductory
statement to the reader, Sale states:
I shall not here inquire into the reasons why the law of
See generally Letters between Volney and Thomas Jefferson, microformed on Thomas Jefferson's Papers, Manuscript Division (Library of Congress). Many of these letters are reprinted in
1 GILBERT CHINARD, VOLNEY Er L'AMERQUE: D'APRES DES DocuvtE\Ts INEDITS Er SA
CORRESPONDANCEAVECJEFFERSON 110 (1923).
SeeLetter from Volney to ThomasJefferson (Apr. 20, 1802), rnidroforn.don ThomasJefferson's Papers, Manuscript Division (Library of Congress), reprintedin 1 CHItN iRD. supra note 34.
at 111 ("When you shall be done with the manuscript you received from Mr. Mclure. it is desired that it may be burnt."). A letter from ThomasJefferson to Volney dated Marcl 17. 1801
explains that a translation to the end of the 20th chapter of The Ruims was sent to Volney
through Mdure. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Volney (iar. 17, 1801). tn I CttRD,
supra note 34, at 110. Thomas Jefferson and Joel Barlow's edition appeared in Paris in 1802.
SeeALuSON, supra note 3, at 50.
Patrick Henry, Virginia Convention, 16 June 1788, in 2 DEIIATE ON -lE CONSTTLTION.
supra note 18, at 696.
, SeeDEvY supra note 30, at 14.
33 See generally GEORGE SALE, 1 THE KORAN: COMMONLY CLLFD THE ALORUN OF
MOHA.MiMiED (2d. ed. 1764).
SSee

id.
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Mohammed has met with so unexampled a reception
in the world, (for they are greatly deceived who imagine it to have been propagated by the sword alone) or
by what means it came to be embraced by nations
which never felt the force of Mohammedan arms, and
even by those which stripped the Arabians of their
conquests, and put an end to the sovereignty and very
being of their Khalifs.
A few pages later Sale adds: "For how criminal soever Mohammed
may have been in imposing a false religion on mankind, the praises
due to his real virtues ought not to be denied him."4' Sale concludes
that the Prophet's "original design of bringing pagan Arabs to the
knowledge of 42the true God was certainly noble and highly to be
commended."

Sale embarks on a long admiring description of the Prophet's
personality and moral character, followed by long detailed chapters
on Islamic history, theology, and law. 3 In the course of his discussion, he disposes of many of the negative myths about Islam.4 He
also compares Islamic law and Islam's historical track record with that
of Christianity and Judaism, pointing out that Islam has done no
worse than the other two religions.
Two points made in this manuscript are particularly salient in
light of Jefferson's writings. First, Sale points out that Prophet
Muhammad rejected the concept of the Trinity and the divinity of
the Virgin Mary. Jefferson had taken a similar position in his correspondence with William Short.47 Second, Sale states that the Prophet

declared that his "business was only to preach and admonish, that he
had no authority to compel any person to embrace his religion."' 8
This point is reiterated by the Qur'an itself, which is translated in the

40 Id at vii.
41 Id. at x.
42 Id. at 51.
43 See id. at 54-55 (noting in particular the Prophet's piety, veracity, justice, liberty,
clemency,

humility, charm, excellent judgment, happy memory, cheerful temper and inoffensive behavior
towards his friends).
44 See i&eat 63-64 (pointing out that, while it was commonly perceived that Islam spread
by
the sword, Prophet Mohammad propagated Islam not by compulsion but solely by persuasion;
that the Prophet's followers had the right to defend themselves against infidels). Many authors,
such as Prideaux, labeled Prophet Muhammad a tyrant. See id.
at 65. Sale corrects this view by
praising the Prophet's morals: "[Hie was a man of at least tolerable morals, and not such a
monster of wickedness as he is usually represented." ld.at 54.
" See i&e
at x, 51, 64-65.
46 See ie at 45-46.
47 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Short (Oct. 31, 1819), in 15 BERGti, supra
note 2, at 221. Jefferson, incidentally, surpasses Muslim belief on this doctrinal point by rejecting the immaculate conception ofJesus. See id.
8 1 SALE, supranote 38, at 64.
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second volume of Sale's Koran.9 Again, Jefferson expressed a similar
point of view in his writings about freedom of belief.
Another author who wrote on such matters was Joseph Priestly.5'
Both Jefferson and Adams were not only familiar with Priestly's iritings, but may have even encouraged him to write about ancient doctrines.52 In fact, Jefferson ordered a copy of Priestly's book, The Doctrines of Heathen Philosophy Compared With Those of Revelation, for John
Adams. 5 Both Jefferson and Adams thought, however, that Priestly
did not do justice to the topic.- This critique indicates a certain level
of sophistication in the knowledge of the two Founding Fathers of
ancient doctrines, a level we are still struggling to acquire in this
country today.
Interestingly, in an earlier book, Priestly addressed the doctrine of
He argued that the great advantage "Mothe unity of God.
hammedanism had over the corrupt [C]hristianity" of that time wras
that it "asserted the great doctrine of the unity of God, against the
Trinitarians." 5 It therefore appears that, despite the fact that some
individuals were quick to brand as "infidels" those who had somewhat
different ideas about Christianity, some of the Founding Fathers did
not relent in pursuing sources of information on the subject, and
speaking out, despite the political fallout.5 This experience no doubt
49 2 SALE, supra note 38, at 31 & n.2 (translating verse 2:256 of the Qur'an, which means "Let
there be no compulsion in religion," as "Let there be no violence in religion," but explaining.
in a related footnote, the idea of the prohibition against religious compulsion).
Notes on Rdigion, reprintkd in 1 THE WRITINGS OF THO.LSJEFFERSON
S
SeeThomasJefferson,
266 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904) ('Compulsion in religion is distinguished peculiarly from
compulsion in every other thing. I may grow rich by art I am compelled to follow, I may recover
health by medicines I am compelled to take agt. [sic] my own judgment, but I cannot be saved
by a worship I disbelieve & [sic] abhor.").
51 See2 SOWERBY, supranote 2, at 121-22.
52 See id. at 122 (relating that, in a letter to Henry Fry dated June 17, 1804.Jefferson wrote:

"At my request Dr. Priestly wrote a comparative view of the moral doctrines ofJesus and of the
antient [sic] philosophers, which he finished just before his death.").
-" See id. at 122-23.

See id. at 123 (relating that, in a letter to John Adams dated January 24. 1814, Jefferson
wrote: "I think with you that Priestly, in his comparison of the doctrines of Philosophy and of
revelation, did not do justice to the undertaking, but he felt himself pressed by the hand of
death.").
55 2JOSEPH PRIESTLY, INSTITUTES OF NATURALAND REVEALED RELIGION 7
(1794).

Priestly's

concern was that Christianity could not spread to heathens. Muslims and Jeus when it ws
viewed as being so corrupt. See id. For further information on this view, see 1 JOSEPH PRIESTLY,

HISTORY OF THE CORRUPTION OF CHRISTIANITY (1797), a work which was considered to be a sequel to Institutes, see supra,and was often included in many of ThomasJefferson's recommended
reading lists.
56

See THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, SECOND SERIES: JEFFERSON'S E\xc'rCrS FROM THE

GOSPELS 11 (Dickinson W. Adams ed., 1983) (describing religiouslybased political criticism of
Jefferson). Rather than embracing Jefferson's tolerance for divergent religious points oficw.
many ofJefferson's opponents during the election of 1800 labeled him an atheist, or considered him to be an infidel and therefore unworthy of serving in the highest office of the country.
See id.; see also ALLISON, supranote 3, at 38-39 (stating that Prideaux warned that many influential people were critical of Christianity and attempted to convince skeptical people of the difference between Christianity and Islam and other beliefs; and that a decline in piety would lead
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hardened Jefferson's resolve to guarantee freedom of religion for all.
In fact, Jefferson argued that society should be tolerant of the religious practices of others so long as they do not harm the public
good.57 He gives the example of killing calves or lambs. 8 This appears to be a reference to the Islamic annual custom in which a lamb
is sacrificed to celebrate the event where Abraham's son was spared
by God and a lamb was sacrificed in his stead. 9 IfJefferson was in fact
making this reference, then it is possible that Jefferson was thinking
of slave practices, since most Muslims in the American colonies at
that time were slaves who were brought forcefully from Africa ° This
raises a further question of the extent of contacts between Jefferson
and other Founding Fathers, and their slaves, and how many of those
were Muslim.
The question of whether the Founding Fathers had meaningful
contact with Muslim slaves is not one of idle speculation, since it is established that many of the Muslim slaves were literate and hence assigned to house duties.6 ' Labor assignments in the house, as opposed
to those in the field, would have allowed Muslim slaves to have increased contact with their "masters." Initial inquiry into relationships
between colonial masters and slaves has already yielded information
that Jefferson, in particular, had extensive contacts with two slaves:
Jupiter and Sally Hemmings. We do not yet have adequate information as to their religious beliefs or the beliefs of other slaves in the
Jefferson household.
Given this historical backdrop, we turn now to the task of presenting a more accurate and genuine understanding of Islam, its basic
constitutional principles, and the dynamics of Muslim societies. This
task is within reach because contemporary America is very different
from, and significantly more free and diverse than, the America of
the Founding Fathers. After all, in those early days, most Muslims in
to tyranny); Charles 0. Lerche,Jr.,Jefferson and the Election of 1800: A Study in the PoliticalSnear,7
WM. & MARY Q. 467, 475 (1948) ("'Atheist' was used on Jefferson just as 'communist'... ap-

plied to Henry Wallace or to any other political figure who challenge[d] the basic assumptions
of our society. ..."). Jefferson relentlessly pressed for religious freedom. See ThomasJefferson,
Notes on Religion, reprintedin 1 THE WRITINGS OF THOMASJEFFERSON, supra note 50, at 266 ("Neither Pagan nor Mahomedan nor Jew ought to be excluded from the civil rights of the Cornmonwealth because of his religion.") (quotingJohn Locke).
57 SeeThomas Jefferson, Notes on Religion, reprinted in 1 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMASJEFFERSON,
supra note 50, at 266.
5- See id.

See QUR'AN 37:102-108.
60 See MICHAEL A GOMEZ, EXCHANGING OUR COUNTRY MARKS: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF
59

AFRICAN IDENTITIES IN THE COLONIAL AND ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 66 (1998) (stating that the

number of Muslim slaves in America may have been in "the thousands, if not tens of thousands").
61 See id. at 85-86.
62See JACK McLAUGHLIN, JEFFERSON AND MONTICELLO 106-08 (1988); see also ANNETTE
GORDON-REED, THOMASJEFFERSON AND SALLY HEMMINGS: AN AMERICAN CONTROVERSY 172, 183
(1997).
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America were slaves. As such, they were denied the right to speak
freelyi5 Bj introducing Islam from the perspective of an "internal
observer," it is finally possible to present Islam accurately and, thus,
to properly refute the claim that Islam is inherently anti-democratic
and disrespectful of human rights. This perspective also provides for
a more accurate analysis of what went wrong with Muslim countries,
and thus helps answer the question of whether American style democracy may be successfully exported to these countries.
I[.INTRODUCTION TO ISLAM AND ITS BASIC CONSTITurIONAL
PRINCIPLES
A. Basic Source and Principle: The Qur'an
Muslims have one basic document that guides the spiritual, political, moral, and social aspects of their lives. This document is the
Qur'an, which Muslims believe is the revealed word of God. The
Qur'an contains a variety of elements, such as stories (often similar to
Biblical ones), moral injunctions, and general as well as specific legal
principles.65 The constitutional principles are sparse but basic."'
They make clear that a state must satisfy two basic conditions to meet
Islamic standards. First, the political process must be based on "elections," or bay'ah67 Second, the elective and governing process must
63

Not all Muslims in America at that time were slaves. See GOMEZ, supra note 60, at 67 (not-

ing that "the Muslim presence in North America antedates the arrival of the English colonists.
Spanish Florida's St. Augustine (and nearby Fort Mose) featured a significant black population ....
The Muslim population, although unquantifiable, must have been significant.-).
Compare supra text accompanying notes 27-28 (discussing the perspectives of Western
commentators on Islam as "external observers").
6 The Qur'an contains stories aboutJesus, Moses, Mary, Adam and
many other biblical figures. It provides moral as well as legal guidance. For example, the Qur'an urges Muslims to
preserve their family ties; take care of the widowed, orphaned, and poor and to avoid gossip
about others. It also speaks about specific penalties for specific crimes and, inter alia, establishes
the laws of marriage and divorce. For more information on Qur'anic principles, see
MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMICJURISPRUDENCE 29-31 (1991) and ABD ALHAMD MUTAWALu, MABADI' NZA.M AL-HUKM Ft AL-ISL.M [PRINCIPLES OF THE SISTEM OF
GOVERNAZCE INIsLM] 34-46 (al-Masarfi Alexandria, 2d ed., 1974).
66 See KAMAL, supranote 65, at 30, 33 ("The Qur'anic legislation on civil, economic, constiis, on the whole, confined to an exposition of the general
tutional and international affairs
principles and objectives of the law."); MUTWAIU, supra note 65,at 34-35.
67 See QUR'AN 60:12, 48:10, 18; see also Azizah Y. al-Hibri, Islamic Consitutionalismand the Concept ofDemocray, 24 CASEV. REs.J. INT'L L 1, 11-13 (1992) (discussing the origins of the term
bay'ah and its significance as an "agreement" between a ruler and those who are ruled). Bayah
is the act by which individual A informs individual B that A supports B's assumption of the leadership position in question, and gives to B his or her allegiance. This is usually, but not necessarily, expressed by a handshake, and is tantamount to casting one vote. It is possible, however,
that a whole delegation cast a collective vote (equal to the sum of its individual members' votes)
in one visit to the candidate. In the end, the winning candidate would be the one with the largest number of votes. For more on this process, see infra text accompanying notes 15687, discussing the election of 'Uthman. Because 'Uthman received the largest number of votes from
the population, the electoral committee (in this case, consisting of one person) nominated him
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be based on "broad deliberation," or shura.! Clearly, very few, if any,
Muslim countries truly satisfy these two criteria today. The reasons
for their failure to do so will be discussed later.
Two fundamental features of Qur'anic philosophy underlie the
broad formulation of the above-mentioned constitutional principles.
The first is that of diversity. The Qur'an encourages ethnic and other
types of diversity as blessings from God.69 Consequently, ancient Muslim jurists recognized the fact that what may suit one culture may not
be quite suitable for another. For this reason, they encouraged each
country to introduce its own customs into its laws, provided that these
customs did not contradict basic Islamic principles. As a result, even
today, the Islamic laws of Muslim countries differ significantly on
various matters. Witness for example the difference in constitutional
and family laws between Egypt and Morocco (both Muslim countries) .7' By reserving room for custom, the Law Giver (God) emphasized the importance of cultural diversity and the ability of each society to make its own choices. These principles have far-reaching
effects, especially in the area of federalism. Section IV will illustrate
how respect for local custom and diversity led the Prophet to balance
carefully the rights of the various tribes (predecessors of the modern
states) against the powers of the Islamic federal system.
The second fundamental feature of the Qur'anicphilosophy is that
of gradualism. Again, the Law Giver recognized both the human
ability to constantly evolve and improve and its need to do so over
as the next khalifah, and he was then immediately confirmed by an overwhelming popular majority. It appears, therefore, that the early Islamic electoral procedure, involving bay'ah, bears
interesting resemblance to our electoral college system.
See QUR'AN 42:38, 3:159; see also al-Hibri, supra note 67, at 21-24 (discussing the Qur'anic
origins of the principle of requiring consultation in government); ABD AL-RAZAK AL-SANHUIt,
FIQH AL-KHILAFAH WA TATAWWURUHA [KHILAFAHJURISPRUDENCE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT] 224-26
(al-Hay'ah al-Masriyah al-'Ammah li al-Kitab: Cairo, 1989); TOUFIC AL-SHAwi, FIQH AL-SHURA WA
AL-ISTISHARAH 49-52 [THEJURISPRUDENCE OF CONSULTATION AND ADVISE] (Dar al-Wafa': Cairo,
1992).
19 See QUR'AN 49:13.
70 See al-Hibri, supra note 67, at 8; WIHBAH AL-ZUHAILI, 2 USUL
AL-FIQH AL-IsLAMI [TILE
FOUNDATIONS OF ISLAMNIIC JURISPRUDENCE] 828-37 (Dar al-Fikr: Beirut,
1986); SUBHI
MAHMASSANI, AL-AWDA' AL-TASHRI'IYAH F1 AL-DUWAL AL-'ARABIAH [LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE ARAB
WORLD] 438-39, 478-80 (Dar al-'Ilm li al-Malayin: Beirut, 3d ed., 1965).
7 Egypt is a republic; Morocco is a monarchy. Furthermore,
their family laws differ significantly. For a detailed comparison of these two and other Muslim countries, see al-Hibri, infra
note 86, at 10-25.
7
See al-Hibri, supra note 67, at 10 (discussing gradualism as being consistent with the
concept of consensus building). Support for the principle of gradualism is also explained in the
following terms:
The Qur'an was not revealed all at one time. Rather, it was revealed in
accordance with the needs and capabilities of society .... Graduality in
the revelation of the Qur'an afforded the believers the opportunity to reflect over it... [,]facilitated continuous contact and [renewed] spiritual
strength so that the hostility of unbelievers ... did not weaken the hearts
of the Muslims.
KAMALI, supra note 65, at 16; see also MAHIMASSANI, supra note 70, at 92.

1999]

ISLAMIC AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

time.73 For this reason, in an Arab society which at the time of revelation consumed a great deal of wine, the divine prohibition against
consuming alcoholic beverages was imposed by the Qur'an gradually.74 The same feature applied to the introduction of democracy.
Given the pervasive authoritarian ideology in the world at that time
(over fourteen hundred years ago), it was clear that human consciousness would need time to recognize the evils of authoritarianism
and reject it in favor of democracy. The Qur'an provided the basic
principles for a constitutional democracy without providing the details of a specific system. Muslims were to interpret these basic principles in light of their customs and the demands of their historical
consciousness, as informed by the era in which they lived.7m As a consequence, Muslim constitutional models would ideally start with basic
democratic elements, remain flexible and continue to progress over
time. Unfortunately, as will be pointed out later, despite all efforts,
the force of authoritarianism in seventh century Arabia and the world
at large was difficult to overcome. As a result, despotism replaced
budding democratic models and thwarted their development.
B. Other sources
While the Qur'an remains the supreme source of law for Muslims,
there are important secondary and tertiary sources as well. Another
source of Islamic jurisprudence, secondary only to the Qur'an, is the
example and words of the Prophet Muhammad, or his sunnah.76
Where the Qur'anis silent, jurists have looked to this source for additional guidance. For example, the Prophet himself was the head of
Madinah, the first Muslim city-state. He acquired this position
through bay'ah and conducted his affairs through shura." Thus, he
set the perfect example for Muslims on how to understand and practice these two concepts. Unfortunately, very few subsequent leaders
actually put these principles to practice.
The third source of Islamic jurisprudence is the "consensus" of
, See KAMALS, supra note 65, at 16-17.
14 See QUR'AN 4:43; 5:90; see also al-Hibri, supra note 67, at 10 (discussing the variance in Muslim law concerning marriage).
7 See al-Hibri, supra note 67, at 8 (acknowledging that change in laws over time is a basic
principle of Islamic jurisprudence); KAMLMI, supra note 65. at 283-86 (stating that rules fomulated "in the light of prevailing custom" may be departed from if the custom on which they were
founded changes over time); MAHMASSANI, supra note 70, at 92.
76 For more discussion on sunnah, see al-Hibri, supra note 67. at 4-7 (stating that the sunnah
is used to "supplement Qur'aniclavs as well as to help interpret them"); see a/so KAtJ, supra
note 65, at 44-48, 58-59 (discussing the history of the sunnah and comparing it to the Qur'an).
See QUR'AN 60:12; 48:10 (mentioning bay'ahs of Muslim men and women); 2 IB% Histut,
AL-SmAlH AL-NABAWIYAH [THE LtFE OF THE PROPHET] 431, 434 (al-Maktabah al-'Uni)ah: Beirut.
reprint, 9th century, n.d.); al-Hibri, supra note 67, at 11-12, 20-24 (explaining the terms tayah
and shura);AL-SHAXl, supra note 68, at 50, 52-53 (noting that shura must be accompanied ith
freedom).
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the Muslims, or ima ",78 The Prophet stated, that if all Muslims agreed
on a matter, then it cannot be wrong 7 9 This principle further consolidated the democratic foundations of Islamic decision-making.
Finally, the fourth source is that ofjurisprudence, or ijtihad8 The
Prophet encouraged qualified Muslims to engage in ijtihad and stated
that God would reward a serious mujtahid (one who engages in ijtihad), even if the wrong result is reached. 8' Qualifications for iftihad
are solely scholarly and are neither gender-based nor a function of
ethnicity, race or economic status. Furthermore, since God states in
the Qur'an that we were all created from the same nafs (soul), it follows that no human being has an a priori advantage over any other,
nor is the mujtahid, as human, immune to error.83 These facts, combined with a deep aversion to arrogance in Islam, prompted classical
scholars to offer their views in a humble manner which recognized
the possibility of error.4 For this reason, many scholars concluded
their treatises or discussions with the statement "but God knows
best."8 5 Also, when Khalifah Abu Ja'far al-Mansur proposed, in the
eighth century that the state officially adopt a particular school of Islamic jurisprudence, his proposal did not go far. 6 Jurists dreaded the
spiritual liability which resulted from forcing their potentially erroneous views on others.

78 See 1 AL-ZUHAILI, supra note 70, at 486-91; KAMALI, supra
note 65, at 168-72; MAtDIASSANI,
supra note 70, at 149-50, 481. A successful bay'ah, see supra note 67, could be by ijma'or by majorig vote.
See KAMALI, supra note 65, at 178-80; IBN MAJAH, 2 SUNAN 3950, at 1303 (Dar al-Ktitub al'Ilmiyah: Beirut, n.d.); MAHMASSAaNI, supra note 70, at 149.
See al-Hibri, supra note 67, at 6-7; 2 AL-ZUHAILI, supra note 70, at 1037-118; KAMALI, supra
note 65, at 86-87, 366-68; MAHmMASSANI, supra note 70, at 132-36, 141-44, 151-56.
81See al-Hibri, supra note 67, at 6; ABU AL-HUSSEIN BIN MUSLIM, 12 SAHIH MUSLIM
BI SHARH

AL-NAWAWI [THE TRUE STATEMENTS OF THE PROPHET, WITH EXEGESIS BYAL-NAWAWI] 13-14 (Dar

Ihya' at-Turath al-'Arabi: n. p., reprint, 8th century) [hereinafter SAHIH MUSLJNI].
See I AL-ZUHAILI, supra note 70, at 496-98; KANALI, supra note 65, at 374-77; MAfIMASSANI,
supra note 70, at 142-43 (stating that the qualifications for itihadare reason, maturity, justice,
knowledge of Islamic studies, and, perhaps, an understanding of the goals of Islamic law).
83 See QUR'AN 4:1, 39:6,
6:98.
84 See ABU AL-BARAKAT AL-DARDIR, 1 AL-SHARH AL-SAGHIR [THE LITTLE INTERPRETATION]
6-7
(Dar al-Ma'arif: Cairo, reprint, 19th century) (calling himself a poor slave of God); I ABU
HAMID AL-GHAZALI, IHYA' 'ULUM AL-DIN [REVIVING RELIGIOUS SCIENCES] 59, 75-76 (Matba'at
Mustafa al-Babi al-Halabi: Cairo, 1939); SUBHI MAHMASSANI, MUQADDIMAH Fl 'IIWA' 'ULUM ALSHARI'AH [INTRODUCTION TO REVIVING SHARI'AH SCIENCES] 30 (Dar al-'Ilm lial-Malayin: Beirut,
1962); see also Azizah Y. al-Hibri, Modesty, in 3 OxFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE MODERN ISLAMIC
WORLD 126-27 (John L. Esposito ed., 1995); KAMALI, supra note 65, at 370-72 (discussing the
procedure a mujfahid should follow if he resolves a matter in opposition to one of his previous
decisions).
1 SAHIH MUSLIM, supra note 81, at 19, 21, 24, 26, 27 (in the margin authored by
alNawvawi); see also 1 AL-DARDIR, supra note 84, at 739; 2 AL-DARDIR, supra note 84, at 765; 3 ALDARDIR, supra note 84, at 728; 1 AL-BUKHARI, SAHIH AL-BUKHARI BI HASHIYAT AL-SINDI [THE
TRUE STATEMENTS OF THE PROPHET, WITH COMMENTARY BY AL-SINDI] 6, 7, 9 (Dar al-Ma'rifaih:
Beirut, reprint, 8th century).
86See MAHMASSANI, supra note 70, at 159; see also Azizah Y. al-Hibri, Islam, Law and
Custom:
Redefining Muslim Women's Rights, 12 AM. U.J. INT.L L. & POL'Y 1, 8-9 (1997).
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Qur'anicphilosophy makes room for gradual progress, as well as
customary and cultural preferences.'- Thus, a mujlahid today can
readily conclude that a Muslim country may choose to be a republic
and still be in compliance with Qur'anic requirements, so long as the
vote for the president is genuinely free and the consultation among
all branches of government is broad. Most importantly, the existence
of a house of representatives would insure that the people's voice is
heard in legislative matters, even if indirectly. Another mujiahid,
however, may make similar arguments for a constitutional monarchy
based on the British example. The interpretations of both mujtahids
would reflect the state of their human and political consciousness,
and usually that of their people, at that particular time and place. It
is that consciousness that informs their understanding of the Qur'an.
A more advanced consciousness may bring into the discussion other
Qur'anicprinciples, such as those of equality and diversity, or focus
more seriously on basic principles, such as bay'ah. It may thus lead to
a more democratically advanced interpretation which transcends cultural customs that are finally recognized as contrary to the Qur'anic
worldview.
C. Is an IslamicState a Theocra , ?
Some Western thinkers concluded that the Islamic state is a theocracy from the fact that itihad, along with the Qur'an and sunnah,
determine the fundamental features of government in a Muslim
state."s This conclusion raises the following important question:
"How can a theocracy be a democracy?" A theocracy is defined as "a
form of government in which a God or a deity is recognized as the
supreme civil ruler."9 In a theocratic system, the laws of God are interpreted by the ecclesiastical authorities, or alternatively through "a
system of government by priests claiming a divine commission."' Another definition of a theocracy specifies a "government by priests or
men claiming to know the will of God." 9'
The Islamic political system does not fall under any of these defiSee supratext accompanying notes 72-74 (discussing gradualism).
See LIPPMAN, supra note 15, at 70 (stating that there is no distinction in Wlarn benween
Church and State); Miller, supra note 1, at 50 (quoting Bernard Leis stating that s5hun tsa
theocracy); EPosrro & VOLL, supranote 1, at 23-24 (noting that even some conservate Muslims
argued that Islam is a theocracy, but they defined theocracy to mean something altogether chfand the
ferent from that found in European exemplars); se also Stephen C. Hicks, On the Ctn
Legal Person, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 789, 84344 (1991) (referring to the "theocrao.n of IMan) Paul
Johnson, Our God Can Lick Your God, N.Y. TIMEs, May 9. 1993. § 7. at 7 (resieiing book by Mark
Juergensmeyer, Reigious Nationalism Coqfronts the ScaularState (1993). which condemns Islamic
theocracy); The Rise of Islamic Politics, CHRISTIAN Sci. MOI\ToR. Apr. 28. 1993, at 20 (diSCusing
the rising religious passion and democratic desires in Arab countries).
-9THERANDOM HOUSEDICTIONARYOFTHEEGuSH i.LkNGUAGE 1471 (unabr. cd. 1983).
90 See id.
q] WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY 1025 (encyclopedic
ed. 1987).
87
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nitions of a theocracy because Muslims have neither clergy nor ecclesiastical authorities. They only have mujtahids92 As stated earlier,
every Muslim who has the pre-requisite qualifications is entitled to be
a mujtahid.93 Not even a mujtahid can claim special knowledge of the
will of God, let alone immunity from error. Furthermore, any person can challenge the view of a mujtahid by simply offering a convincing critique. 9' This happened to the Khalifah 'Umar when he gave a
speech in a mosque.9 He proposed a change in marriage laws and an
old, unknown woman in attendance stood up and challenged him. 97
She said, 'You shall not deprive us [women] of what God gave us." 8
The Khalifah asked her to provide support for her statement. When
she cited a Qur'anicverse, the Khalifah said: "The woman is right and
the Khalifah is wrong."99 He actually had no other choice but to defer
to her, since his rule was based on Qur'aniclaws, not on his political
strength or military power.'00
Because ijtihad plays such an important part in Islamic societies,
the Prophet declared education to be the duty of every Muslim, male
and female. 01 This led mujtahids to argue that education in Islam is
nearly, if not completely, compulsory for all Muslims. 0

2

Furthermore,

if a person is unable to afford education, the family, neighborhood,
or even the state, are charged with the financial responsibility for that
person's education.103 Consequently, all Muslims, male or female,
white or black, rich or poor, have equal opportunities to engage in
See
See
94 See
95 See

supra text accompanying note 81 (defining mujtahid).
supra text accompanying note 82 (noting the qualifications for ijtihad).
supra text accompanying note 83 (stating that all are created from the same soul).
al-Hibri, supra note 67, at 24 ("[I]t was always understood and agreed that it was the
duty' of every Muslim to right wrongs even if the perpetrator was the khalifah.").
See id. at 25 (telling the story of Khalifah 'Umar). Khalifah is the title of the Muslim head
92
93

of state. Khilafah is the name of the office itself.
97 See id. (suggesting a reduction in the amount of the groom's assets gifted
to the bride).
98 Id.
1 AL-GHAZALI, supranote 84, at 50; see also al-Hibri, supra note 67, at 25 (telling the story of
Khalifah 'Umar); al-Hibri, supra note 86, at 40 (re-telling the story of Khalifah 'Umar).
100See al-Hibri, supra note 67, at 24 (noting the tradition that the khalifah and the state be
subject to the rules of the Qur'anand sunnah).
I See 1 AL-GHAZALI, supra note 84, at 15; al-Hibri, supra note 86, at 36 (noting that the
Prophet stated that "[p ] ursuit of knowledge is the duty of every Muslim."); 2 ABD AL-HALIM ABU
SHUQQAH, TAHRIR AL-MAR'AH FI'ASR AL-RIsALAH [LIBERATING WOMAN IN THE ERA OF EARLY
ISLAM] 41 (Dar al-Qalam: Kuwait, 1990).
102See QUR'AN 2:159. Many modem scholars have concluded from this verse that education
in Islam is compulsory or practically so. See, e.g., al-Hibri, supra note 86, at 37-38 (discussing the
argument regarding which type of knowledge is required); MUHAMMAD AL-IBRASHI, ATTARBIYAH AL-ISLAMIYAH WA FALSAFATUHA [ISLAMIc EDUCATION AND ITS PHILOSOPHY] 53-59
(Mustafa al-Babi al-Halabi Press: Cairo, 3d ed., 1975); 1 'ABD ALLAH 'ALWAN, TARBIYAT ALAWLAD FIAL-ISLAM [THE UPBRINGING OF CHILDREN IN ISLAM] 262 (Dar as-Salam: Beirut, expanded 6th ed., 1983); AHMAD AL-AHWANI, AL-TARBIYAH FIAL-ISLAM [EDUCATION IN ISLAM] 101
(Dar al-Ma'arif: Beirut, 1980).
10s See al-Hibri, supra note 86, at 37 ("Al-Qabisi, a prominent jurist, noted that,
if parents are
financially unable to educate their children, the community must pay to educate them instead."); AL-AHWANI, supranote 97, at 101.

1999]

ISLAMIC AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAI S

ijtihad
Therefore, in a Muslim state, any Muslim may contribute to the
religious interpretation of the Qur'anic text. Furthermore, no one
may oblige another to abide by his or her own understanding of the
Qur'an.' Since humans are fallible, Muslim jurists recognize the importance of the diversity of opinion and freedom of conscience, even
within the same religion.' 3 In fact, they view this diversity as a sign of
God's mercy, because it allows people to choose that jurisprudence
which best suits their conditions. 6 For this reason, Muslim schools of
thought proliferated, living side by side despite disagreement on important issues. 7 This Islamic respect for diversity of opinion foreshadows the American commitment to the "marketplace of ideas"
principle.
Although selecting a school of thought to suit of one's conditions
seems like forum shopping, it is not intended to be. A Muslim must
make an honest and not an opportunistic choice in such matters."'
For example, Imam al-Shafi'i, a major scholar and founder of the
school bearing his name, revised his jurisprudence when he moved
from Iraq to Egypt.' 9 The explanation was simply that the new jurisprudence evolved in light of the new conditions.'" As a consequence
of this example ofjurisprudential revision, jurists generally recognize
the principle that "laws change with the change in time and place.""'
1o4See supranotes 80-86 and accompanying text (discussing an individual's capacity to engage
in ijtihad); see also al-Hibri, supra note 67, at 6 ("Islam guaranteed for each individual the freedom of choice in such matters.").
10 See al-Hibri, supra note 86, at 6 (discussing the acceptance of differences in i~tjhad);
MA- BSSANI, supranote 84, at 30.
'0' See al-Hibri, supra note 86, at 6 (noting no fear of retribution from God); ABI' ABDALLA
AL-SHAFI'I, RAiBAT AL-U AHI-FI IKHTILAF AL-A'LMMAH (MERCY TowAmas THE MUSLLt
COMUiNuITY LIEs IN THE DIskGREEMENT OF rrs LAMS (RFmGious LEkDERS)) 25-26 (Mu'assasat
al-Risalah: Beirut, reprint, 14th century, 1994); MAHMASSANI, supmanote 70, at 481.
'0 See al-Hibri, supranote 86, at 6-7 ("Thus, hundreds of schools of #jtihaddeveloped, each
best suited to its own community and that community's culture."); AL-SHAKAI, Supra note 106, at
7-14; MASSANI, supra note 70, at 99-132.
0 SeeMAiASSANI, supra note 70, at 179 (stating that the average person is free to abandon
his adopted school of thought to follow another on a specific issue, so long as the change is
based on reasoning and not on the desire to avoid a burdensome result); ser also A1u ISHAiQ ALSHATIBI, 2 AL-MUAFAQAT [THE CONCORDANCES] 386-87 (Dar al-Ma'rifah: Beirut, reprint 14th
century, n.d.) (stating that a person who follows exemptions by the various schools of thought
should resolve every burdensome matter, and that one who follows subjective inclination has
abandoned piety).
109 See TAHAJABIR AL-ALWANI, USUL AL-FIQH AL-ISLAMI [SOURCE METHODOLOGY
IN ISL..MIC
JURISPRUDENE] 33-36 (Yusuf Talal DeLorenzo trans., International Inst. of Islamic Thought:
Herdon ed. 1990); MAHMLASSANI, supra note 84, at 40; MLIA.3,..LAD ABU ZR
t.%, AL-SHAn'l
145-46 (Dar al-Fikr al-'Arabi: Egypt, 1948); 'ALA' AL-DEEN AL-SAML'.RQUNDi, Tmu,\T .L-KtIL.Fw
BAYN AL-ASLAF [THE METHOD OF DSAGREMENT A.1ONG THE PREDECESSORS] 13 (Dar al-Kutub
al-Ilmiyah: Beirut, reprint, 11th century, 1992).
110 See
IMASSANI, supra note 84, at 40; ABU Z7mRAH, supra note 109. at 145-46; ALSAMARQANDI, supranote 109, at 13.
I MAHASSANI, supra note 70, at 478; see also al-Hibri, supra note 67, at 8 (discussing the
principle that "laws may change with the passage of time or the change of place or circum-
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In such a society of open religious choices, it cannot be said that, as
in a bona fide theocracy, an ecclesiastical authority is interpreting the
laws, even if certain scholars are revered by the population, or if, per
chance, they occupy public office.
Furthermore, the head of a Muslim state has no divine claims or
attributes."2 He or she-there have been Muslim women heads of
state"3--is a representative of the people and is subject to the rule of
law. ' 4 The head of state serves at the pleasure of the people and may
be removed at any time by the people for corruption, oppression or
any other significant transgression.
As late as the nineteenth century, the Egyptians resorted to this power when they removed the
governor appointed by the Ottoman sultan. ' 6 The governor was incensed when the people elected a replacement. He noted that he
was appointed
by the Ottoman sultan and was "not removable by the
'peasants. 1 17 The Egyptians responded by noting that their tradition
was different and that they had always been able to remove an oppressive governor."8 Ultimately, the governor and the Ottomans understood the point, and the governor was replaced." 9
While the Muslim state is not a "theocracy" as that term has been
understood, it is nevertheless true that an Islamic state is subject to
God's laws because the constitution of a Muslim state is based on values and principles expressed in the Qur'an. That feature, however, is
not sufficient to establish the claim that a Muslim state is a theocracy.
This conclusion is supported by two reasons. First, since there is no
such thing as compulsion in Islam, no nation may be coerced into ac-

stance"); 2 AL-ZUHAILI, supranote 70, at 1116-18.
112 See al-Hibri, supra note 67, at 11 ("IT]here is generally no history
of claims to rule by divine right, least of all by the prophets."); AL-SANHURI, supra note 68, at 72. Note that the
Umayyads advanced the theory of jabr, which argued that they came to power because of God's
will. They did not argue, however, that they represented God's will on earth, nor did they appropriate the religious role of the mujtahids. For more on such views in Islamic societies, see
HUSSEIN 'ATWAN, AL-UMAWIYUN WA AL-KHiLAFAH [THE UMAYADS AND THE KI-tALIFATE] 25-29
(Dar al-Jil: Beirut, 1986); see also MUTAWALIU, supra note 65, at 185.
113Among famous Muslim queens are Queen Arwa of Yemen (11th century) and Shajarat
alDur of Egypt (13th century). For more on Muslim queens, see FA\TIa\H MERI'NISSI, TIlE
FORGOTTEN QUEENS OF ISLAM (1993).
114 See al-Hibri, supra note 67, at 11, 24 (discussing the two ways
in which the will of the people is expressed); AL-SANHURI, supra note 68, at 72; HASSAN AL-ZEIN, AL-ISLAM WA AL-FIKR ALMU'ASSER [ISLAM AND MODERN THOUGHT] 80, 82-83, 134-36 (Dar al-Fikr al-Hadith: Beirut,
1997).
MSee MAHMOUD AL-KHALIDI, MA'ALIM AL-KHiLAFAH F1AL-FIKR AL-SYASI AL-ISLAMI [FEATURES
OF KHILAFAH IN ISLAMIC POLITICAL THOUGHT] 293-311 (Dar al-Jil: Beirut, 1984); ABU AL-HASSAN
AL-MAWARDI, AL-AHKAM AL-SULTANIYAH [SULTANIC RULES] 19-20 (Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyah: Bei-

rut, reprint, 11th century, 1985).

116 See MUHAMMAD AMARA, AL-ISLAM WA HUQUQAL-INSAN

(Dar al-Shuruq: Beirut, 1939).
1" See id at 211.
M,8
See id. at 212.

1,9See id. at 211.

[ISLAM01
AND HUMA\N RIGHTS] 210-12
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cepting a constitution which does not reflect its deep-seated beliefs.' "
Consequently, if the people end up choosing a constitution which reflects basic Islamic principles, then that choice represents the free
wll of the people.
So, given (a) a Muslim society's free choice of a constitution based
on Qur'anic values,' (b) that the khalifah in the Muslim state has no
divine claims or attributes,'2- (c) that the will of the people in that
state continues to be expressed through bay'a, s.ura and
'and
(d) that there is no ecclesiastic structure in a Muslim state, then the
difference between a Muslim state and a secular one is reduced to the
ultimate origins of their laws and not to whether the people's will is
decisive. Thus, structurally, the two systems are the same, though
substantively they may differ.
Second, if basing a nation's constitution on its collective religious
values, without more, would result automatically in the determination
that such a state is a theocracy, then the United States itself may be
designated as a theocracy. After all, it has been repeatedly claimed
that this country's laws are derived from its Judeo-Christian tradition.'2 Clearly, there is more to a theocracy than the source of one's
values.
IV. THE CHARTER OF MADINAH: FURTHER CONSTITUTIONAL

PRINCIPLES
While we have not yet uncovered evidence that the Founding Fathers were familiar with the Charter of Madinah, executed among
and between the Prophet Muhammad and the various tribes, it is
nevertheless instructive to study that charter as a way of introducing
additional comparative constitutional concepts into the discussion.
The Charter represents an early seventh century example of "federalism."2 6 At that time, the Prophet concluded agreements with
various Muslim and non-Muslim tribes of the city as a way of forging a
in See 2 SAiL, supra note 49, at 31 (translating verse from the Qurlan forbidding compulsion
in Islam).
12' Seesupra notes 66-68, 78-81 and accompan)ing text.
122 See supra note 112 and accompan)ing text.
See supra notes 66-67, 73 and accompan)ing text.
See supra notes 91-92 and accompan)ing text.
12 See, ag., PAGE SMITH, A NEW AGE BEGINS 19-20, 27, 29, 44-45 (1976);
ste also Gary Ledes.
Taking the Bible Saisly, 1987 A. B. FOUND. REs.J. 311,316-18.
'.
The Charter of Madinah ias executed not beneen states, but between tribes. The
Prophet headed the Madinah cit)-state, which corresponded to a federal umbrella under the
terms of the Charter. For references to this Charter, I use two sources: Akn English translation.
for the convenience of the reader, seeAKRA. DIvA' AL-'UMARI, I MADINAN SOCETYAT THE TIME
OFTHE PROPHET 107-10 (Huda Khattab trans., International Inst. of Islamic Thought: Herndon
ed. 1991) [hereinafter MADINAN SOCIETY]; and, since the English version is at times %vong.the
original Arabic text, see 1 AKRAM DIYA' AL-'UMARI, AL-SIRAH AL-NfAWIMMM AL-S.XHI1L% [THE
CoRREcrAccouNr OF THE LIFE OF THE PROPHET] (Maktabat al-'Ulum una -- Hikaun: al-Madinah
al-Munawwarah, 1994) [hereinafter AL-SIRAH].
12
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new "federal" community which would no longer be plagued by divisive tribal warfare. 27 The Charter of Madinah, which reflected the
product of these agreements, declared all Muslim and Jewish tribes of
Madinah (apparently, there were no Christians) to be one community. At the same time, each tribe retained its identity, customs and
internal relations'29 The "federal" system of Madinah was responsible, however, for such matters as common defense and peacemaking,
purposes similar to those in the Preamble to the American Constitution, which refers to insuring "domestic Tranquility, [and]
provid[ing] for the common defence."'
The Charter also contained
its own partial bill of rights, which was supplemented by the Qur'an
and sunnah. Among the rights that it protected were the right to
freedom of religion, and the right not to be found guilty because of
the deeds of an ally, a form of guilt by association which was widely
practiced at the time." For this reason, due process protections are
important in Islamic criminal justice.
A major right supplemented by the Qur'an, which was available to
the Founding Fathers, 132 is the right to privacy. The Qur'an enjoins

Muslims not to enter a home without the permission of its occupant,
and not to spy on others. 33 Significantly, the Qur'an protects some of
the rights mentioned in the Fourth Amendment to the American
2 For a reflection of the federal aspect of this agreement, see MADINAN SOCIETY,
supra note
126, cis. 2, 25, at 107-09; AL-SIRAH, supra note 126, cis. 2, 25, at 282-84. Note that the Arabic text
speaks of "people," not of "men."
128 See MADINAN SOCIETY, supra note 126, cls. 2, 25-35, at 107-09; AL-SIRAH,
supra note 126, cls.

2, 25-35, at 282-84.
129 SeeMADINAN SOCIETY,supra note 126, cls. 3-11, 25-33, at 107-109; AL-SIRAH,
supra note 126,
cls. 3-11; 25-31, at 282-284. Note that the parenthetical statement in the English translation,
guaranteeingJews freedom of religion, was not a parenthetical statement in the Arabic original,
but was part of the main text.
1S U.S. CONST. preamble. Compare id., with MADINAN SOCIETY, supranote 126, cls. 17,
36(a),
45 (a), at 107-10, and AL-SIRAH, supra note 126, cls. 17, 36, 42, 45, at 283-84.
131 See MADINAN SOCIETY, supra note 126, cls. 41, 25 (providing for freedom of
religion), and
37(b) (protecting against guilt by association), at 109-10; AL-SIRAH, supra note 126, cls. 41, 25
and 37(b), at 284. For commentary on the translated freedom of religion provision, see supra
note 129.
1 See, e.g., supra note 30 (indicating thatJefferson owned a copy of
the Qur'an).
133 The Qur'an instructs in the area of privacy as follows:
O ye who believel Enter not houses other than your own until you have
asked permission and greeted those in them. That is best for you, perhaps
you will remember. If you find no one in these houses, then do not enter
until permission is given to you. And if you are told to go back, then go
back. That is a purer course of action for you, and God knows what you
are doing.
QUR'AN 24:27-28. Further instruction in this area provides:
O ye who believe, avoid suspicion (as much as possible): for suspicion in
some cases is a sin: and spy not on each other, nor speak ill of each other
behind each other's backs. Would any of you like to eat the flesh of his
dead brother? Nay, you would abhor it ....And (so) fear God, for God is
all-forgiving and merciful.
QUR'AN 49:12.
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Constitution.'3

In a global era when religious intolerance was the rule, the Charter of Madinah stated that the Jews of the community, who were party
to the Charter, were "one people" with the Muslims, though it provided "to each their own religion.""" More specifically, this meant
thatJews who became party to the Charter were entitled to both succor and equality.ls6 They also had the same standing as Muslims and
were entitled to Muslim loyalty.'0 If wronged, the Charter provided
that Jews must be helped.1 Furthermore, both Muslim and Jewish
signatories had a duty and a right to mutual assistance and consultation. 39 In exchange for these rights, the Charter makes it clear that
the Jews must bear their portion of the communal defense expenses,
as long as the city is at war.14

The latter provision goes well beyond the statement made by
George Washington, over a thousand years later, in a letter to a Hebrew congregation in Newport, Rhode Island, in which he stated:
For happily the government of the United States,
which gives to bigotry no sanction, to persecution no
assistance, requires only that they who live under its
protection should demean themselves as good citizens, in giving it on all occasions their effectual support.

The Charter of Madinah repeatedly emphasized the principles of
fairness and equity for Jews and Muslims.42 For example, no one
could be punished for the wrong committed by another, even if the
person was an ally.4 All believers were required to oppose anyone
1
In particular, "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses [and] effects[,J" is protected by the Qur'an. CompareQURAN, 2:188 (prohibiting taking even part of the
property of others unjustly); and idLat 24:61 (prohibiting taking even food from houses other
than one's own, without permission), uwth U.S. Co,*ST. amend. IA%For an illustmation of how
the privacy argument works under Islamic law, see Azizah al-Hibri, Statter-nt on The Leztnsl
Scanda: An
Amerizan
Muslim
Perpctdie (last
modified
Feb.
27.
1999)
<http://-wv.kaamah.org/karamah/press/le nsky,_scandal.htn>.
ZMADINAN Socw-I, supra note 126, cI. 2, 25, at 107, 109; AL-S1RAli, supra note 126, ci. 2, 25.
at 282, 284.
13 See TADwAN SOCIETY, supra note 126, cl. 16, at 108; AL-SiRAH, supra note 126. ci. 16, at
283.
137 See IADINAN Soct=,
supra note 126, cls. 37(a) (2d and 3d subcl.). 46. at 110; AL-SIFRuI,
sut note 126, cls. 37, 46, at 284-85.
See IADINAN SoCIETY, supranote 126, cd. 37(a), at 110; AL-SIRAH, supra note 126, ci. 37, at
284.
Seesupranote 138.
14 See
i&.
141 Letter from George Washington to the Hebrew Congregation
in Newport, Rhode iland
(Aug. 18,1790), in 6 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 285 (Dorothy Twohig ed., 1996).
See MADINAN SOCIETY, supra note 126, cis. 3, 4, 6-11, 13, 17, 47, at 107-10; L,%-St
AU,1,supra
note 126, cls. 3,4,6-11, 13, 17,47, at 282-85.
13 See MADINAN SOCIET, supranote 126, cd. 37(b), at 110; AL-SIRAH, supra note 126, ci. 37(b),
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who sought to spread injustice, sin, enmity, or corruption among
them, even if the malefactor was an offspring of one of4 the believ1
ers.'" A believer was not permitted to shelter an evil-doer.
Based on the above analysis, it is readily apparent that there are
significant parallels between the concepts expressed in the Charter of
Madinah, executed in the seventh century, and those of the American Constitution, drafted in the eighteenth century. Given this similarity, the research conducted by the Founding Fathers warrants further investigation to determine whether it uncovered, either directly
or indirectly, the basic principles contained in the Charter." Also,
both the Charter and the Constitution deserve further analysis to uncover additional similarities. This analysis would, among other
things, support the argument that American constitutional principles
have a lot in common with Islamic principles. Such a conclusion
would be helpful in evaluating the possibility of exporting American
democracy to Muslim countries.
V. THE DEMISE OF DEMOCRACY IN MUSLIM SOCIETIES
The previous two sections expounded some basic democratic constitutional principles guaranteed by the Qur'anand sunnah (as the latter was partly exemplified by the Charter of Madinah). Nevertheless,
a quick glance at past and present Muslim states will reveal that
hardly any of them has truly satisfied the democratic standards articulated by Islam. What went wrong? This question is somewhat similar
to that raised by the Founding Fathers and their contemporaries, who
wanted to spare the new American republic a similar fate. As stated
previously, some authors attributed the problem to a tyrannical
Prophet.r47 The bay'ah and Charter of Madinah, however, refute this
view of the Prophet Muhammad, as do other examples from his sunnah. Indeed, the Prophet was a modest, fair, and kind leader who
continuously sought the advice of those around him, including

at 284.
1" See MADINAN SOCIETY, supra note 126, cl. 13, at 108; AL-SIRAH, supra note 126, cl. 13, at
283.

14, See MADINAN SOCIETY, supra note 126, cl. 22, at 109; AL-SIRAH, supra note 126, cl. 22, at

283.
16 One way the Founding Fathers may have been indirectly familiar with the Charter is
through the writings of European authors. This influence is often underestimated due to our
lack of knowledge of the extent to which European intellectuals were familiar with Islam at the
time. For example, according to Professor Mommsen, the year 1730 witnessed a surge in European literature supportive of the Prophet Muhammad. See KATHERINA MOMMSEN, COETHE WA
AL-'AIAM AL-'ARABI [GOETHE AND THE ARAB WORLD] 180-81 (A. Ali & A. Makkawi trans., al-

Majlis al-Watani li al-Thaqafah wa al-Funun wa al-Adab: Kuwait, 1995). In particular, a book by
the Dutch Henri Conte Boulainvillier, which praised the Prophet and his accomplishments,
influenced Voltaire's thought and resulted in a reversal of his earlier hostile view. See id.
147See supra notes 6, 11, 17.
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women." In fact, a delegation of Arab women extended the bayah to
him, thus establishing during his lifetime the right of Muslim women
to participate in the political process.'
In this section, I present a de novo analysis of the fundamental historical reasons for the failure of Islamic democratic institutions in
Muslim countries. Primary among these reasons is a series of events
that occurred soon after the death of the Prophet. An analysis of
these events will show that democratic failure was not the result of the
fatalism or apathy of Muslims as some eighteenth century writers
concluded.'-" Rather, this failure resulted from serious challenges
arising soon after the death of the Prophet for which neither the
budding Muslim state nor its leadership was adequately prepared.
These challenges were made even more insurmountable in light of
the historical moment in which the whole region, and perhaps the
world, was engulfed.
I now turn to the historical analysis of the failure. As it turned
out, the democratic example presented by the society of Madinah was
to endure only for a fleeting, shining moment in the history of the
Arab Peninsula and Muslim communities beyond. Soon after the
death of the Prophet, many Muslims began reverting to their former
tribal ways.'5' During that critical period, in which a great deal of upheaval followed, the Muslim leadership, primarily consisting of the
Companions of the Prophet, was faced with impossible choices. "' In
hindsight, one may now wonder whether the choices ultimately made
10 See QUR'AN 60:12; see also al-Hibri, supra note 86, at 20 (citing ancient Arabic sources reporting that the Prophet used to mend his owm clothes, cut meat, play with children, perform
chores around the house and recounting that the Prophet also consulted women); 1 RHs.%.
IBRAHIM HASSAN, TARmH AL-ISLAN [HiSTORY OF ISLAm] 152-56 (Maktabat al-Nahdah alSharqiyah: Cairo, 7th ed., 1964); 1 ABU SHUQO,H, supra note 101, at 231 (citing the critical incident when Muslims were about to disobey the Prophet and in which, by following the advice
given by his wife, Urn Salamah, the Prophet successfully avoided the crisis).
1 See QUR'AN 60:12; al-lbri, supra note 67, at 12 (explaining the lack of limitations
placed
on citizens' participation in the political process).
See supranote 14 and accompanying text.
See I HAssAN, supra note 148, at 342; 2 HASSAN, supra note 148. at 8-9. For detailed accounts of events subsequent to the death of the Prophet, see AL-TAi'u. infra, at 257-306; 4 IBN
HISHAM, supra note 77, at 656; see also AL-ZEIN, supra note 114, at 14, 28. The death of the
Prophet was a shock to the community. Even his companion "Umar Ibn al-Khattab refused to
believe it. See 2 ABU JA'FAR AL-TABARI, TARIKH AL-UM.Nt WA AL-MULuK [TIlE HSroRY OF
NATIONS AND KINGS] 232 (Dar al-Kutub a-'nmiyah: Beirut, n. d., reprint. 9th century, 198S).
Then Abu Bakr al-Siddiq, who became the first kialifah, made his famous speech in which lie
said: "Oh People! Whoever amongst you worshiped Muhammad, [let them know that]
Muhammad has died. Whoever amongst you worshiped God, [let them know that] God is alive
eternally." IR; 5 IBN KATHIR, AL-BIDAYAH WA AL-NIHAYAH [THE BEGINNING AND nl1E FND) 243
(Maktabat al-Maarifi Beirut, 2d reprint, 14th century, 1974); see also I FL sSxN, supra note 148,
at 151.
1
The Companions of the Prophet were friends and supporters of the Prophet. According
to some accounts, they numbered in the thousands and included a large number of women.
For more on the women Companions, see MUHAMMA SAID ML1I. YED, . MWS'AT ALSAHABIaYAT [ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LiFE OF THE FEMALE COMPANIONS] (Maktabat al-Ghazali: Syia,
1990).

JOURNAL OFCONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 1: 3

were the right ones. Nevertheless, I argue in this section that the
demise of Islamic democracy was not a consequence of these choices.
Rather, it was the direct result of the historical consciousness of the
people and the world at that time, in the absence of a fully developed
constitutional and legal apparatus for managing crises.
Having lost their Prophet, many Muslims reverted to traditional
authoritarian forms of leadership. The Qur'an recognized this potential problem when it referred to those of weak faith.'" The Prophet
understood it as well. 54 Nevertheless, he sowed the seeds of democracy by taking, against all odds, the first few steps of what turned out
to be a long historical journey for Muslims. By doing so, he irrevocably established democratic tradition as part of his sunnah, and provided
yet one more example of the Qur'anic philosophy of gradual155
ism.

Unfortunately, several events that occurred soon after the
Prophet's death halted the development of his democratic tradition
in favor of reverting to an authoritarian regime. Of these events, two
in particular stand out in Muslim history: the murder of the third
khalifah,'Uthman, and the military battle between the grandson of the
Prophet and Khalifah Yazid, of the Umayyad dynasty. Each event occurred in the seventh century.
The first of these events centered around a fundamental constitutional issue, the second around a legal/moral one. The first historical event resulted from the inability of the community to agree on an
answer to the question: What constitutes an impeachable offense?
The issue in the second instance was resolving the dilemma: Is it better to fight to uphold legitimacy (or one's principles) or to refrain in
order to preserve harmony and peace within the community. Even
today, these are difficult questions. An understanding of the historical background of these two events is important in order to recognize
their significance.
The first event of import was occasioned by the people's bay'ah to
153

The Qur'anadmonishes against faithlessness as follows:

Muhammad is no more than a messenger; many were the messengers that
passed away before him. If he died or were slain, will you then turn back
on your heels? If anyone does turn back on his heels, he will not harm
God in the least. And God will reward those who give thanks to Him.
QUR'AN, 3:144. This verse clearly illustrates the Qur'anicphilosophy of gradualism. God (lid
not expect Muslims to be immediately and totally transformed by the message of the Qur'an.
Muslims did, however, start on the road to democracy in Madinah. The Madinan experience,
though ancient, may be regarded as a model for building modern democracies in Muslim countries.
1
See 4 AL-BUKHARI, supra note 85, at 198 (stating that the Prophet predicted that two
groups of Muslims would fight each other for the same cause after his death); 5 IBN KATI-iR,
supra note 151, at 201. The Prophet also stated that there would be people who read the
Qur'an, but for whom this reading would not reach beyond their vocal chords. See 4 AtBUKHARI, supranote 85, at 198. Through such people, Islam would pass "as fast as an arrow."
Id.
See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
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'Uthman as their new khalifah after extensive shura among them. ':
'Uthman, a pious and kind man, was a Companion of the Prophet,
but he turned out to be a weak khalifah. ' "I He remained halifah for
almost twelve years, until he was murdered at the age of eighty two." 4
As he grew older, he fell increasingly under the influence of some of
his impious relatives.'s He appointed them to high posts and, as a result, they accumulated wealth and power.W Muslims, in various regions, were unhappy with 'Uthman's appointments and nepotism.""
When their frustration finally turned into anger, Muslims departed
from regions as far as Egypt, Basra, and Kufa (in Iraq) to march on
Madinah in protest,.tH
The Muslims of Madinah were quite concerned about these developments.'ta Their leaders were themselves displeased with 'Uthman's policies, but it does not appear that they found these policies
to have risen to the level of impeachable offenses or that they warranted his resignation. After all, the dignity of the office of khilafah
reflects on the dignity of the whole Muslim people and a Hhalifah
could only be impeached for a limited number of reasons which were
specified by Muslim jurists.'6 So, the Companions tried to give
Some also defended him
'Uthman good advice and guidance.'6t
t6
invited him to repent b 7
Still,
others
accusations.
against unfair
'Uthman then declared his repentance publicly, promising to change
15 See 2 AL-TABAPi, supra note 151, at 582-83; 7 IBN KATHIp., supra note 151, at 146 (stating

that even secluded women, children and travelers were consulted about the baYlah for 'Uthmanl).
17

158

See 1 HASSAN, supranote 148, at 253,263,265; 7 IB. KATHIR, supranote 151. at 145, 169.
See 2 ABU AL-HASSAN AL-MAS'UDI, MIURUJ ALTHAHAB WA MA'ADE AL-JAW,HAR [PASTRES OF

GOLD AND MINERALS OF EssENcE] 331 (Dar al-Andalus: Beirut, reprint, 10th century 1978); 1
HASSAN, supra note 148, at 265,354.
0 See 2 AL-MAS'uDi, supra note 158, at 334-36; 2 AL-TABARI, supra note 151, at 659-60. 668;
'ATWAN, supra note 112, at 25; 7 IBN KATHIR, supranote 151, at 169.
169See 2 AL-TABARI, supra note 151, at 652; 7 IBN KTHIR, supra note 151, at 171; see alqOLASSADI, infranote 164, at 113-14; 3 Ai.TABARI, supra note 151, at 8.
161 See 3 AL-TABARI, supra note 151, at 661; 2 AL-MAS'UDI, supra note 158, at 334-35; 7 IB.N
KATHm, supra note 153, at 168, 171, 176, 201. For a list of all the charges, including nepotism,
and 'Uthman's rebuttal, see 2 AL-TABARI, supra note 151, at 651.
162 See 2 AL-MAS'UDI, supra note 158, at 343-44; 2 AL-TAB.R, supra note 151, at 652; 7 IB
KATHIR, supra note 151, at 168, 170, 173.
'5' See 2 AL-TABARi, supra note 151, at 663 (noting that the Madinans wrote a letter
to "Uthman asking him to repent); id. at 653 (relating that as the conflict intensified the Madinans
stayed home).
See AL-KHALIDI, supra note 115, at 293-381; SAIF AL-ASSADI, AL-FInAH %%WAQ.,vT .L-JAvLAL
[SEDMON AND THE BATLE OF THE CAMEL] 19 (Ahmad Ratib 'Armoush ed., Dar al-Nafa'is: Beirut, 7th ed., 1993).
'5 See 7 IBN KATHIR, supra note 151, at 168 (stating that, in particular. '.i, the cousin of the
Prophet and the front runner for the position of halifah after 'Uthman, was asked by the people to advise 'Uthman); 2 AL-TABARI, supra note 151, at 653, 657, 664 (noting that "i gave
'Uthman his straightfonvard advice and at the same time admonished the crowds for their behavior); 7 IBN KATHIR, supra note 151, at 171, 173.
166 See 2 AL-TABARI, supra note 151, at 658; 7 IBN KATHIR, sup-a note 151, at 171.
'67 See supra note 163.
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his objectionable policies. ' 6e As a result of these events, the crowds
were mollified and decided to give 'Uthman another chance. The
out-of-town crowds turned back to go home. 69
Unfortunately, it appears that Marwan, a relative of 'Uthman, decided to take matters into his own hands. 70 He forged a letter to the
wali (governor) of Egypt in the name of the khalifah, ordering him to
kill the leaders of the insurgents upon their arrival.'
The letter,
however, fell into the hands of the departing crowds.' Incited by the
letter, the crowds turned back immediately towards Madinah and surrounded the residence of 'Uthman. 7 3 The khalifah denied writing
the letter.' 74 The denial served only to anger the crowds further by
making the khalifah look either like a liar or an incompetent ruler.'
The crowds gave 'Uthman three choices: deliver the deceitful Marwan to the crowd, resign, or be killed. 76

'Uthman refused to shirk his responsibilities by resigning.
It
also appears that he was unwilling to flee or turn his relative Marwan
over to the enraged crowds.'78 Seeing it as his only remaining option,
'Uthman prepared for his death.' 79 Interestingly enough, although
the Companions sent their sons to protect 'Uthman's residence, they
did not take the threat to kill him seriously.' 80 After all, 'Uthman was
the khalifah, and the moral authority of the khalifah made such an act
1

169

See2 AL-TABARI, supra note 151, at 655, 658, 660; 7 IBNKATHIR, supra note 151,
at 169, 171.
See 2 AL-TABARI, supra note 151, at 655. But see 7 IBN KATHIR, supra note 151, at 174 (sug-

gesting that the crowds had no genuine intention of returning to their homeland).
170 See2 AL-MAS'UDI, supra note 158, at 343; 2 AL-TABARI, supra note 151, at 666; 7 IBN KATHIR,
suPranote 151, at 186.
See 2 AL-TABARI, supra note 151, at 655-56; 7 IBN KATHIR, supranote 151,
at 174-75, 186.
17 See2 AL-TABARI, supra note 151, at 655-56; 7 IBN KATHIR, supranote 151,
at 174, 186.
173See2 AL-TABARI, supra note 151, at 662, 664, 666; 7 IBN KATHIR, supra note 151, at 174,
187,
174 See2 AL-TABARI, supra note 151, at 664, 666; 7 IBN KATHIR, supra note 151, at 175, 186.
175 See2 AL-TABARI, supra note 151, at 666-67; 7 IBN KATHIR, supra note 151, at 186.
176There are minor disagreements as to the actual choices 'Uthman
had, but they all boiled
down to the same thing: Leave or pay the consequences. Compare 2 AL-TABARI, supra note 151,
at 664 (relating that the Khalifah was given the choice between resigning, punishment and
death and that the Khalifah responded that he was too old and weak for punishment), with 7
IBN KATHIR, supra note 151, at 197 (stating the three choices), 174 (stating that the Egyptian
crowds said, "if he leaves us [resigns], we will leave him"), 177, and 180 (stating that he was
asked to resign or deliver Marwan to them).
See2 AL-TABARI, supra note 151, at 664, 666, 667, 675; 7 IBN KATHIR, supra note 151,
at 180,
184.
178See 7 IBN KATHIR, supra note 151, at 180; 2 AL-TABARI, supra note 151, at 661-62
(noting
that on one occasion a man from the crowd broke 'Uthman's cane while 'Uthman was delivering a speech in a mosque). The crowds also denied water to 'Uthman's household and prevented him from going to the mosque to pray. See id. at 672; see also 2 UL-MAS'UD1, supra note
158, at 344.
1 See2 AL-TABARI, supra note 151, at 674; 7 IBN KATHIR, supra note 151, at 198, 181.
Bo See 'AL-ASSADI, supranote 164, at 20; 7 IBN KATHIR, supra note 151, at 176, 181-82 (indicating that there were seven hundred Muslim leaders and supporters at 'Uthman's residence,
among whom were sons of the Companions, but 'Uthman sent them away); see also 'ALASSADI,
supra note 164, at 68-69 (stating that many refused to leave); cf 2 AL-MAS'UDI, supra note 158, at
344-45 (stating that when Ali had heard that the crowds may kill 'Uthman he sent his own children with arms and other fighters to protect him).
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unthinkable. The moral authority of 'Uthman, however, was eroding
rapidly8"' because he had not instituted the changes he had promised,
and he had written other regions asking for military support.' " The
crowds were getting out of control,'83 and when he tried to address
them at the mosque, they stoned him.' 4
After surrounding 'Uthman's residence for over forty da)s, the
angry crowds finally realized that the Idwlifah was not going to change
his ways, resign, or deliver Marwan.'8 Feeling betrayed by the hhalifah
and fearing defeat and retribution by the approaching armies, mobs
decided to storm 'Uthman's house."" Some of the angry mobs
burned down 'Uthman's front door and attacked his protectors,
while others in the crowds climbed the wall and murdered 'Uthman
as he read the Qur'an.87 The repercussions of this bloody act continue to be felt in the Muslim world to this day.Ir
The story of Khalifah 'Uthman has many lessons. For our purposes, we focus on the following facts. While Muslim leaders wanted
to abide by the rule of law, the larger Muslim community, which at
the time extended from Egypt to Syria and Iraq, contained significant
elements that had not fully internalized this new concept. Had the
leadership concluded that 'Uthman's offense was impeachable, they
would have been able to remove him. In fact, politically, such an action would have benefitted several potential successors. But these individuals were not concerned with personal political interest. Their
main concern was the proper and just application of Qur'aniclaw. By
contrast, the angry crowds, recognizing that the khalifah was an old
and physically weak man, opted for the pre-Islamic use of force instead of the Islamic rules of law.
'Uthman's weak personality permitted authoritarian tribal tendencies, previously submerged, to reappear. One may conclude from
this event that the error committed by the early Muslim leadership
was not that of being too cautious in impeaching 'Uthman. Rather,
" See supranotes 156-62, 170-75 and accompanying text.
1 See 2 AL-TABARI, supra note 151, at 662, 664; see aLso id at 667 (stating that 'Udhman told
the crowds that, while the option was available to him, he had chosen not to send for military
support in order to avoid bloodshed); 7 IBN KATHIR, supra note 151. at 173 (stating dtat the
crowds discovered that 'Uthman had not changed his uays), 188 (indicating that die armies
were coming, though not indicating that the Khahfah had requested them).
1
See supranote 173-76.
8 See2 AL-TABARI, supranote 151, at 654, 660; 7 IBN KkTHIR, supranote 151, at 176.
1
See 2 AL--MAs'trI, supra note 158, at 346 (noting that 'Uthman as under siege for 49
days; 2 AL-TABAPR, supranote 151, at 655 (noting that 'Uthman %as under siege for 40 days).
See2 AL-TABARI, supranote 151, at 669, 674, 676; 7 IBN KATHIR, supra note 151. at 188; see
also 2 AL-MAs'uDI, supranote 158, at 345.
1 Many in the crowds raided Beit al-Mal the Islamic state Treasury. Revelation of this act
led many to conclude that the motivation for rebellion was not entirely honorable. See 2 .,.TABARI, supranote 151, at 669; 7 IBN KATHIR, supra note 151, at 183-185. 188-89.
1 This paper will discuss some of these repercussions, but it is important to note that this
event and the second event discussed herein remain -live" issues in the Muslim community, despite the passing of fourteen hundred years.
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the error was that the leadership underestimated the consequences
of 'Uthman's weak personality at that early stage in Islamic constitutional development. Had the Muslim leadership properly assessed
the situation, they may have been able to remedy it in time. This is
especially true in hindsight. As history reveals, 'Uthman's policies allowed his relatives, the Umayyads, to accumulate significant wealth
and power during his rule, seize the office of the khilafah illegitimately, and ultimately transform a traditionally democratic office into
a monarchical one.189
The second event that halted the evolution of democratic processes in Muslim states followed from the first. The murder of Khalifah 'Uthman brought chaos and bloodshed to the community at
large.190 As a result, a deep aversion to internecine fighting developed. 1 It thus became highly important to reestablish unity and
harmony in the Muslim community. 92 It was under these conditions
that the Umayyads ultimately seized power. They accumulated power
by force and deceit.9 3 Yet, even the Umayyads recognized the importance of religion to the Muslim psyche. Thus, they retained the symbols of an Islamic democratic system while emptying them of all content. 94 By co-opting these institutions, the Umayyads were able to
confuse their subjects and diffuse much popular anger. Most significanty, the Umayyads transformed the political succession system into
a hereditary system, coerced the bay'ah of Muslims, and weakened the
concept of shura.'95 Many Muslims, though disgusted by this turn of
18 See 3 AL-TABARI, supra note 151, at 8; AL-ASSADI, supranote 164, at 113-14
(stating that the
Umayyads financed 'Aisha's trip to Basra in an attempt to undermine 'Ali); see also ABi
HANIFAH AL-DAYNOURI, AL-AKHBAR AL-TiWvAL [THE LONG STORIES] 121-22 (Dar al-Fikr al-Hadith:
Beirut, reprint, 9th century, 1988) (noting that the Umayyads bought the allegiance of some
allies); 2 AL-MAS'UDI, supra note 158, at 343 (relating that the Umayyads planned this course of
action long before the murder of 'Uthman).
190 SeeAL-ASSADI, supra note 164, at 155-79
(describing the Battle of the Camel and its ensuing chaos, which particularly shocked all Muslims). In this battle directly resulting from 'Uthman's murder, despite all attempts to avoid a confrontation, Muslims fought each other for the
first time and thousands were killed. See id.; 3 AL-TABARI, supra note 151, at 54-55, 58; 8 IBN
KATHIR, supra note 151, at 243.
191 SeeAL-DAYNOURI, supra note 189, at 126-27, 151; 3 AL-TABARI,
supra note 151, at 5, 35, 78; 7
IBN KATHIR, supranote 151, at 253-54, 258.
i9 See 3 AL-TABAR, supra note 151, at 78, 158; 8 IBN KATHIR, supra
note 151, at 148; see also 2
AL-DAYNOURI, supranote 189, at 126, 165-66.
'93 See3 AL-TABARI, supra note 151, at 101, 153, 165, 269-74; 'ATWAN,
supra note 112, at 83-94;
7 IBN KATHIR, supra note 151, at 273, 276-278, 242-43; see also AL-DAYNOURI, supra note 189, at
148, 152-53, 173; 1 HASSAN, supra note 148, at 278.
194 For examples of symbols of the Islamic
democratic system, see supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text (explaining that a Muslim head of state has no claim to divinity); supra note
189 and accompanying text (explaining the transformation of Muslim states from deliberative
into monarchical regimes); infra note 195 and accompanying text (explaining that the processes of bay'ah and shura were weakened); see also AL-ZEIN, supranote 114, at 14; 1 HASSAN, supra
note 148, at 278.
195 See 3 AL-TABARI, supra note 151, at 260, 269-70; 'ATWAN,
supra note 112, at 51-52, 84-86; ALZEIN, supra note 114, at 172; 1 HASSAN, supra note 148, at 437; 2 HASSAN, supra note 148, at 7-8;
7 IBN KATHIR, supranote 151, at 146-47.
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events, decided to live with the status quo rather than initiate another
cycle of bloodshed and instability. '
There was one notable exception. Before his death, the first
Umayyad khalifah arranged the bay'ah from leading Muslims to his
son Yazid. 19 Four important leaders, including al-Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet, refused to give it.1 Upon becoming the khalifah,
Yazid attempted to coerce al-Hussein into giving him his bayah.'9 At
the same time, supporters from Kufa encouraged al-Hussein to challenge Yazid's claim to the khilafah.2 When al-Hussein sent a messenger to Kufa to assess the situation, Yazid decided to end any potential
threat from al-Hussein.! He appointed a new wali for Kufa, and ordered him to kill or exile al-Hussein's messenger m The wali did so,
and he also threatened the people of Kufa with the use of force." Intimidated by the power of the Umayyads, the support of the people of
Kufa for al-Hussein waned until he found himself left with approximately seventy fighters.205 AI-Hussein tried repeatedly to reach a
peaceful resolution with the wal, without being coerced into giving
his bay'ah.2 " The wali, however, was in no mood to compromise.

19 See3 AL-TABRI, supra note 151, at 5, 14, 164-65; 8 IBN KATHIR, supra note 151. at 148, 166;
see alsoAL-DAYNOURI, supranote 189, at 166.
197 See3 AL-MAS'UDI, supra note 158, at 27-29; 3 AL-TABARI, supra note 151, at 260; AL-ZE ,.

su4 xra note 114, at 73; 2 HASSAN, supra note 148, at 437; 'ATWAN, supranote 112, at 52.
See 3 AL-TABARI, supra note 151, at 260, 269-70; 8 IBN KATHIR, supra note 151, at 151; see
also AL-DAYNOURI, supranote 189, at 173 (stating that al-Hussein refused to give a secret bay'ah
to Yazid, preferring to wait until he met and consulted ith the rest of the people).
199 SeeAL-DAYNOURI, supranote 189, at 172-73; 3 AL.-TABARI, supranote 151, at 269-70.
See AL-DAYNOURi, supra note 189, at 174, 183, 190 (stating that 18.000 Kufis gave bay'ah to
al-Hussein); 3 AL-TABARI, supra note 151, at 275, 286, 301 (relating that a letter from alHussein's emissary informed al-Hussein that 12,000 people from Kufa gave bay'ah to him); 8 lB
KxnzT,
supra note 151, at 170 (stating that the Kufis promised 100,000 supporters for alHussein), 151-52, 158 161, 165 (stating that eighteen hundred Kufis gave bayah to al-Hussein):
see also AL-DAYNOURi, supranote 189, at 184-85; 3 AL-TABARI, supra note 151, at 295 (stating that
al-Hussein was repeatedly warned of the hypocrisy of the Iraqis).
991 See AL-DAYNOURI, supra note 189, at 176; 3 AL-TABARI, supra note 151, at 274-75; 8 IB.N
KArHt, supranote 151, at 152.
See'L-DAYOURi, supra note 189, at 176; 8 IBN KATHIR, supra note 151, at 152.
'3 SeeAL-DAYNOURI, supra note 189, at 176-77, 182; 3 AL-TABAt, supra note 151. at 281,287; 8
IBN KATHIR, supra note 151, at 155-56, 158.
2" See AL-DAYNOURI, supra note 189, at 181, 186; 3 AL-TAB Mu, supra note 151, at 288, 315; S
IBN KATmu, supranote 151, at 154-55, 169.
"0 See AL-DAYNOURI, supra note 189, at 191; 3 AL-TABARI, supr note 151, at 298 (stating that
al-Hussein had 45 knights and about 100 foot soldiers); 8 InN KATHIR, supra note 151. at 171
(stating that al-Hussein had about 100 supporters), 169 (describing how there were at least
4,000 fighters in the army of Yazid, and how the support of al-Husein by the people of Kufa
waned).
2D6 See 3 AL-TABARI, supra note 151, at 298, 312, 313 (stating that the wall of Kufa, appointed
byYazid, ordered that al-Hussein be killed if he refused to give the bayah); se also 8 lWN KATHMI
supra note 151, at 170 (noting that al-Hussein proposed several alternatives to avoid a battle but
was prevented by Yazid's military chieftains from returning to Madinah), 179. 180-81; ,ALDAYNOURi, supra note 189, at 190-91 (stating thatYazid's army denied al-Hussein and his people
access to water). But seeAL-DAYNOURI, supranote 189, at 194 (stating that Yazid was saddened b)
the death of al-Hussein).
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He wanted to eliminate al-Hussein while he still could, given that alHussein's support was still strong in HijaZ, and most Muslims viewed
him as more eligible for the khilafah than Yazid
Yazid's forces massacred al-Hussein, his fighters, and all the male
members of that branch of the Prophet's family, except for two children. 2'0 The women were taken to Damascus, the seat of Yazid's government.21 In an act of overwhelming courage, Zainab, the granddaughter of the Prophet, confronted Yazid in his palace and
condemned his rule of force as unjust and oppressive.1 2 Zainab's defiant act, and the resistance of al-Hussein and others who understood
the full significance of the unfolding events, prove that Muslims did
not lose their democratic institutions because of an "Islamic attitude
of fatalism. 213 Indeed, had the Muslims adopted a fatalistic attitude,
many lives would have been spared. The loss of democracy was simply the result of a confrontation between the rule of law and the rule
of force. Fourteen hundred years ago, the odds, or what may be
termed "historical consciousness," overwhelmingly favored the rule of
force.
After the massacre of al-Hussein's family, the rule of Islamic deliberative democracy was once and for all replaced by an absolute monarchy, which transmitted power through heredity. The monarchy
continued to act and rule in the name of Islam in order to confuse
the population and discredit any opposition. It also found jurists who
developed jurisprudence supporting its interests. 21 4 Yet, the Qur'an
states that kings bring disgrace and degradation to any town they enter, and the Qur'anictwin requirements of ba'yah and shura are inconsistent with a hereditary system of political succession.2
The loss,
therefore, of legitimacy of Muslim regimes in the eyes of the people
can be traced to the installment of a hereditary, monarchical system
to supplant the ba yah and shurasystem of determining leadership.
For many centuries afterwards, prominent mujtahids who witSee AL-DAYNOURI, supra note 189, at 189-90; 3 AL-TABAIU, supra note 151, at 298; 8 IBN
at 170.
Western part of today's Saudi Arabia. It includes Makkah and Madi-

KATHIR, supra note 151,
208 Hijaz refers to the

nah.

20q SeeAL-DAYNOURI,

supra note 189, at 174; 3 AL-TABARI, supra note 151, at 295; 8 IBN KATIIR,
su ra note 151, at 151.
10 See AL-DAYNOURI, supra note 189, at 193 (stating that two children were spared).
But see 3
AL-TABARI, supra note 151, at 298 (stating that only one sick adolescent male was saved).
21 See AL-DAYNOURI, supra note 189, at 193-94; 3 AL-TABARI, supra note
151, at 339; 8 IBN
KATHIR, supra note 151, at 194, 196.
212 3 AL-TABARI, supra note 151, at 339-40 (describing how
Zainab called Yazid an oppressive
ruler and asked him if the granddaughters of the Prophet were prisoners of war); 8 IBN KATtIIR,
supra note 151, at 195-96.
1 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
214 See 1 AL-GHAZAU, supra note 84, at 48, 64, 67; 2 AL-GHAzAu, supra note 84, at 351; AL-ZEIN,
sup-a note 114, at 41-44.
2,5 See QUR'AN, 27:34 (quoting the Queen of Sheba saying, "Whenever Kings enter a town,
they plunder it and humiliate its noblest people.").
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nessed these and subsequent power struggles recused themselves
from political life and diverted their attention to other matters, such
as the educational, social and spiritual welfare of the community2"'
Many well-known jurists were punished when they challenged, or
even refused to cooperate with, the system.2 ' 7 The general population
fared no better. The rights to privacy, free speech and due process
were curtailed. Women lost the rights they previously enjoyed during
the Prophet's life, such as the right to receive an education, engage
in business and freely consent to their own marriages.' 4 In time, ijtihad withered, and states began choosing their official schools of
thought,2 9 and "personal status codes."2 These lavs denied men and
women rights to which they were entitled during the Prophet's lifef!
Thus, the "lack of encouragement for free thinking" was thus not
an "Islamic" trait.2 Rather, it was a policy adopted by power-hungry,
irreverent tyrants who usurped the khilafah from the people. As far as
the tyrants were concerned, knowledge in the hands of the people
enlightened them as to their human rights and would have enabled
them to measure the extent of their oppression. As such, religious
and, later, secular knowledge would have been, and remains, a danger to the regimes of such tyrants. Today, Muslims continue to desire
both democratic government and freedom of expression. Given the
repressive policies of many governments that rule Muslim citizens,
the important questions are: (1) How can a people replace its repressive government with a democratic one without the use of force?;
and (2) How can a people governed by the use of force transform its
collective consciousness, as well as its political system, towards respecting the rule of law, without provoking and having to endure a
long period of national instability?
I argue optimistically that today's methods of conflict resolution
and restorative justice may help provide answers to these questions. I
suggest that both the Companions and al-Hussein attempted to use
these methods during the "'Uthman" and "Yazid" crises but failed be216 See
217 See

1 AL-GHAzALi, supra note 84, at 73; 2 AL-GHZAUL,
supra note 84. at 140-14.
1 AL-GHAZAU, supra note 84, at 33- 34; AL-ZEI.. supra note 112, at 45.46; IuN

KHALDOUN, AL-'UQQADIMAH [THE IN'RODUCrION] 209 (Kimb al-Qalam: Beirut. repnnt. 14th
centuy, 1978); IBRAHIMAL-AVAZIR, 'ALA, MAsHARiF AL-QduR, ,.-KHi-.5S ILR AL-HIJRI [AT riff

TURN OF THE FIFIEENTFH CENruRY HUIRAH] 42 (Dar al-Shuruq: Beirut, 1989). But see 2 %GHAZAIU, supra note 114, at 337-51 (providing instances where people who spoke out to the
ruler directly were not punished).
216 For more information on the curtailment of the rights previously enjoyed by women, se
al-Hibri, supra note 86, at 14-21, 41-42.
219See id.at 14.

220 See id at 18 (discussing the concept of ta'ah, which reduces the status
of women tinder the
law).
221Both men and women were denied the right to a true bay'ah and Mumr, but the denil of

women's rights was more comprehensive. For more on this subject. see al-Hibri, supra note 86,

passim, and 1ABu SHUQQAH, supranote 101, at 7-38.
See supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing the general curtailment of rights enjoyed by men and women).
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cause of the historical consciousness prevalent at the time, which
overwhelmingly favored the use of force.22
Given the preceding analysis, it can readily be concluded that the
Founding Fathers did not quite understand what really went wrong
within Islamic civilizations. Nevertheless, the ancillary question of
whether the Founding Fathers succeeded in avoiding the same pitfalls may still be posed. While I cannot be sure that the Founding Fathers succeeded in their task, I believe that they did lay a solid foundation in the American Constitution, but that many of the safeguards
were developed over time, during historical eras that were more favorable towards the rule of law. Even with this strong foundation, we
continue today to struggle with at least one of the two questions that
perplexed and divided Muslims fourteen hundred years ago: First,
what offenses are impeachable? Second, is it better to fight to uphold
legitimacy (or one's principles), or to refrain in order to preserve
harmony and peace within the community? Clearly, Abraham Lincoln and his contemporaries struggled with this dilemma before embarking on the Civil War.
In fact, a comparative study between al-Hussein's battle with Yazid
and the American Civil War would be instructive in shedding some
light on the second question. In conducting this study, it may be
worthwhile to focus on answers provided by American historians to
questions, such as: Could the Civil War have been avoided? Were
there serious attempts to resolve the conflict peacefully? If so, why
did these attempts fail? For the purpose of assessing the possibility of
Muslim borrowing from the United States, we may also want to pose
follow-up questions, such as: How did this country succeed in establishing and preserving its constitutional/legal structures, despite challenges that included a revolution and a civil war? Also, this article has
suggested one initial answer to explain the demise of Islamic constitutionalism, namely, the historical consciousness that predominated
at the time. There are many more answers to contemplate, especially
in light of later developments in Muslim countries.
Since the time the Founding Fathers conducted their inquiries
about Muslim countries, a great deal has taken place there. The Ottoman Empire collapsed, and so did many other regimes in the area.
The region experienced the authoritarian rule of Western colonialism and has since experienced Western cultural, political and technological hegemony. These are important developments which require
further study. In particular, it would be instructive to investigate
whether these recent experiences would, regardless of any similarity
between Western and Islamic democracy, tend to facilitate or complicate constitutional borrowings from the West. The answers to these
questions may lie not only in constitutional law but also in studies of
22 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 184-88 (recounting that angry
crowds stoned and
ultimately killed Khalifah 'Uthman), and 206 (recounting the massacre of al-Hussein).
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culture, politics, and mass psychology.
FINAL REMARKS

The first part of this article established the existence of many similarities between the thought ofJefferson and other Founding Fathers
and some basic Islamic ideas. It established thatJefferson, for example, was familiar with Islam. In fact, he owned a Qur'an with a substantive historical introduction. Additionally, Jefferson read and later
translated part of The Ruins, a book authored by the controversial
French writer Volney, for whom Jefferson had a great deal of admiration. Volney's work reviewed older civilizations and studied the reasons for their demise. A discussion of the Turkish system and its excesses was thus important. Apparently, Jefferson was intent on
developing a legal system that avoided the mistakes of prior civilizations. But he also learned from these civilizations and attempted to
replicate their successes. At present, the extent to which Islamic concepts informed Jefferson's thoughts is unknown. The impact of Islam
on Jefferson's thought could have come from two sources: Europe, or
Muslim slaves in the United States.
Scholarly works are now being written about the extensive borrowing, legal and otherwise, by Europe from Islamic civilizations.' Jefferson, for example, read the works of the German author Baron
Samuel Puffendorf, sometimes citing matters of Islamic law.-" Thus,
the extent to which Puffendorfs thinking may have been influenced,
directly or indirectly, by Islamic thought deserves further research.
Recent studies focused on American Muslim slaves, some of whom
were literate religious figures.2 6 These slaves were used for service inside the house instead of in the field.- Laboring inside of colonial
houses would certainly have given learned Muslim slaves a greater
opportunity to interact with their "masters." The issue of whetherJefferson could have been exposed to Islamic philosophy through such
an experience is still under study. We already know, however, that
2

SeeJohn Maqdisi, The Islamnic Originsof the Common Law, N.C. L REv. (forthcoming, 1999);

see also MOMiSEN, supranote 146.
See Frank L. Dewey, ThomasJefferson's Notes on Divorce, 39 IVM. & %Lw Q. 212, 214, 221

(1982) ("Among the Turks is a kind of marriage called Kabin, where parties agree on a fixt [sic)
time of separation, securing to the woman a sum of money on dismission- (quoting Lau, of ,ature and Nations 6. . 20 note (5)). Jefferson cited Pufendorf more than twenty times and The
Law of Natureand Nations is the work most frequently mentioned in Jefferson's notes. &e id. at
214.
See RICHARD BRENT TURNER, ISLAM IN THE AFRICN-AMERICaw E.%: ENCE 25-32 (1997)
(profiling the lives of Job Ben Solomon, Yarrow Mamout. and Abd al-Rshman lbrahinu): se
also GoMEz, supra note 60, at 71-85 (discussing other well-recognized American Muslims);
SmiLVANfAA. DIOUF, SERVANTS OFALLAH: AFRICAN MUSUMS ENSL\%vED I\NTHE .AMERICs 50. 5646

(1998) (profiling the lives of Omar ibn Said, Angelo Solimann (also know as Mamnadi). Baron
Rogr and Ed Thorpe).
See supranote 64-65 and accompanying text.
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Jefferson spoke of the right of religious groups to sacrifice sheep, a
specifically Islamic practice. 228 Also, Jefferson's view of God is highly
consistent with the Islamic one. In fact, at times he was attacked by
his contemporaries as an "infidel," a serious charge in any era. Were
Jefferson's religious and constitutional views influenced by his readings on Islam? No conclusions have been formulated on this matter
yet, but this research is ongoing.
Nevertheless, whether Jefferson's views were affected at all by Islamic thought through the writings of European thinkers, his own
readings of a translated Qur'an, or discussions with Muslim slaves, the
fact remains that fundamental similarities exist between the American and Islamic constitutionalist systems. This is clear from our
analysis not only of the Qur'anicprinciples, but also from analysis of
the sunnah of the Prophet as expressed in the Charter of Madinah.
The second part of the article focused on two major events that
contributed to the demise of Islamic democracy. This focus was designed to refute the analyses offered by eighteenth century European
writers, which blamed the absence of democratic institutions on "apathy," or the attitude of "fatalism" among Muslims. 2 9
Together, the two parts of this article open the door for a fair assessment, based not only on knowledge of true Islamic principles, but
also of the contributions of Islamic thought to world civilization in
general and early American thought in particular. From this vantage
point, the inference may properly be drawn that the Founding Fathers engaged in some borrowing, positive as well as negative, from
Islamic civilizations.
One more question remains. May we conclude from the great
deal of similarity between American and Islamic democracies that
exporting our democratic ideas to Muslim countries will succeed?
Pending further study of the ramifications of recent historical events
in the region, one may answer with a qualified "yes." Importation of
American constitutionalist ideas cannot succeed, however, without
the same painstaking process of critical examination and adaptation
in which our Founding Fathers engaged. Each Muslim country has
an extensive cultural, religious and political history that deserves to
be recognized and accommodated in devising a democratic system
suitable for its own people.
Several things would help that process. First, a curtailment of the
United States' support for tyrannical governments in Muslim countries would aid in the process of incorporating Western democratic
structures into their political systems. Many of these regimes protect
American economic interests in exchange for that support. The
United State must decide, however, whether it would like to protect
its economic interests abroad at all costs, or whether it would like to
Z28
2N

See supranote 58 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 11-18 and accompanying text.
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implement our human values internationally. In short, the issue here
is whether we can allow ourselves, given our constitutional and moral
beliefs as a nation, to use other people solely as means as opposed to
ends in themselves. We have already answered this question domestically by recognizing the liberty of enslaved Africans, by enacting civil
rights legislation, and by attempting to encourage diversity. Our
policies, however, as opposed to our pronouncements, indicate that
we have not fully resolved this issue on the global front.
Second, American Muslim jurists could also assist in expediting
the process of critical examination and adaptation of democratic institutions by critiquing human rights violations abroad, acting as interpreters of the United States Constitution to other Muslims, and
discussing such issues as freedom of belief, speech and elections in
Islam. American Muslim jurists must particularly focus on the constitutional separation of Church and State, and adapt this concept to
the sentiments of Muslim societies. If explained as a guarantee of
freedom of belief for all, the concept would then of course be consistent with the Charter of Madinah. If understood as an anti-religion
provision, however, a highly spiritual population will most likely reject the concept.2"
Furthermore, it might be helpful to American Muslim jurists to
investigate other borrowing links between Western and Islamic
thought to facilitate acceptance of certain notions now viewed as exclusively Western. In this regard, further investigation of T. B.
Irving's claim that Islamic thought led Europe, and later the United
States, to the idea of the separation of Church and State would be
,varranted.?'

= Of course, American jurists themsehes continue to debate these two interpretations een
today. See- eg., J. H. GARvEY & FREDRCIK SCHAUER, TIiE FIRST A.iENDML\Tr: A RE.DER. 512-633
(2d ed., 1996); G. STONE, ErAL, CoNsTrrTrnoNAL L-%W
1455- 1463 (2d cd.. 1991).
23 SeeT. B. Irving, The Process of Arab Thought in Spain, IV STUDIES INISL.I. no. 2,
Apr. 1967,
at 65.

